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Procedural Wrongdoing
Matthew A. Shapiro*
Both the practice and the study of civil justice are rife with accusations
of litigation “abuse.” Although it’s tempting to dismiss all this abuse talk
as merely rhetorical, the concept of abuse in fact has deep roots in the
normative structure of civil procedure’s doctrinal apparatus for regulating
parties’ wrongful litigation conduct—their procedural wrongdoing.
Prior accounts of procedural wrongdoing have maintained that parties
abuse the civil justice system whenever they violate a procedural rule
that’s calibrated to maximize the net benefits of litigation. Such accounts,
however, ignore the many rules that define procedural wrongdoing not in
terms of the effects of litigation conduct, but rather in terms of parties’
motivations, forbidding parties to act with certain motives or for certain
purposes. According to these rules, which this Article labels motivationsensitive restrictions, the very same litigation conduct can either
constitute procedural wrongdoing or not, depending on a party’s
motivations for engaging in it.
This Article provides a comprehensive analytical account of civil
procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions. In doing so, it contends that
the restrictions have ambiguous normative consequences for civil justice.
On the one hand, the restrictions can foster a thin but nevertheless
valuable form of procedural civic virtue, prodding parties to attend to
important public values even as they pursue their own private ends
through the civil justice system. On the other hand, precisely because they
focus on parties’ subjective purposes, the motivation-sensitive restrictions
risk inflaming public discourse about civil justice by inviting participants
in policy debates to transmute their disagreements into moralized
accusations of abuse or bad faith. We can try to mitigate these latter,
discursive effects by emphasizing the relatively modest demands imposed
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. For helpful comments and
conversations, I thank Kevin Davis, Kim Ferzan, Brenner Fissell, Andrew Gold, John
Goldberg, Ethan Leib, David Noll, Richard Re, and Emily Stolzenberg, as well as participants
in the Section on Litigation’s panel at the 2022 Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools, the North American Workshop on Private Law Theory VIII, the Sixth
Annual Civil Procedure Workshop, and a workshop at Rutgers Law School. I am also
grateful to John Lee, Adam Moore, and their fellow editors of the Brigham Young University
Law Review for their editorial work.
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by the motivation-sensitive restrictions—the fact that such rules require
parties only to abjure certain illicit purposes rather than to become
primarily public-regarding in their litigation behavior.
This Article’s account of civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions also sheds new light on leading theories of civil justice, which
have largely glossed over the doctrinal infrastructure for addressing
procedural wrongdoing. In contrast to the “private enforcement” model
espoused by most civil procedure scholars, the motivation-sensitive
restrictions (modestly) limit the purposes parties may pursue through civil
litigation but make no systematic attempt to ensure that parties promote
rather than subvert governmental regulatory policy, belying common
portrayals of plaintiffs as stand-ins for the state—“private attorneys
general.” But the restrictions also expose an underappreciated public
dimension of prominent theories of private law, insofar as they curb
party autonomy by requiring parties to attend directly to public values
when taking certain actions during civil litigation. Considered in light
of civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions, the civil justice
system proves to be both more private and more public than how it’s
generally understood.
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INTRODUCTION
Both the practice and the study of civil justice are rife with
accusations of litigation “abuse.” Most recently, there have been
widespread calls to sanction the lawyers who filed lawsuits
challenging the results of the 2020 presidential election,1 and at least
two federal district courts so far have obliged, with one
pronouncing the lawsuit before it “a historic and profound abuse
of the judicial process” and the lawyers’ litigation tactics
“abusive.”2 Such denunciations tap into a deep vein of rhetoric
regarding the American civil justice system. Defense-side interests
and other proponents of civil justice “reform” routinely charge
plaintiffs with filing “frivolous” or “abusive” lawsuits and seeking
unduly burdensome discovery.3 Invoking common law
prohibitions against champerty and maintenance, they decry thirdparty litigation funding—in which financial institutions pay
plaintiffs’ litigation expenses in exchange for a share of any
recovery—for stoking “inauthentic” claims.4 Some have even gone
so far as to sue plaintiffs and their lawyers under the Racketeer

1. See, e.g., Brent Kendall & Alexa Corse, Trump 2020 Election Lawsuits Lead to Requests
to Discipline Lawyers, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
trump-2020-election-lawsuits-lead-to-requests-to-discipline-lawyers-11620568801; Andrew
Strickler, Mich. Election Fraud Attys Can’t Skip Sanctions Hearing, LAW360 (Jul. 8, 2021, 4:21 PM),
https://www.law360.com/legalindustry/articles/1401155/mich-election-fraud-attys-can-tskip-sanctions-hearing.
2. King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d 680, 688 (E.D. Mich. 2021); see also O’Rourke v.
Dominion Voting Sys., 552 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1207 (D. Colo. 2021) (concluding that the lawsuit
“was filed in bad faith”).
3. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (decrying a supposed onslaught of “frivolous”
lawsuits); About, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., https://www.judicialhellholes.org/about/
(last visited Oct. 11, 2022) (cataloging alleged “abuses within the civil justice system”);
Lawsuits, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., https://www.uschamber.com/lawsuits (last visited Oct. 11,
2022) (pledging to “protect employers from abusive litigation”); Mission, AM. TORT REFORM
ASS’N, https://www.atra.org/about/mission/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2022) (condemning “the
cycle of lawsuit abuse”); see also infra note 243 and accompanying text.
4. See generally Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011)
(identifying, but ultimately rejecting, such criticisms).
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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)5 for including
allegedly “fraudulent” claims in class actions.6
Lest it seem that such accusations run in only one direction,
advocates and scholars have increasingly condemned as
oppressive the use of the civil justice system by creditors to collect
consumer debts and by landlords to evict tenants.7 And many have
criticized would-be defendants for enlisting the courts to compel
individuals into private arbitration, thereby thwarting their access
to the public civil justice system altogether.8 All sides in
contemporary debates about civil justice thus appear to take it for
granted that private parties can abuse the public civil justice system.
Some actions in the context of civil litigation, everyone seems to
agree, amount to procedural wrongdoing.9
It’s tempting to dismiss all this abuse talk as merely
epiphenomenal—a kind of proxy battle in the ongoing ideological

5. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2018).
6. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of Fraudulent
Claiming, 115 MICH. L. REV. 639 (2017); Briana Lynn Rosenbaum, The RICO Trend in Class
Action Warfare, 102 IOWA L. REV. 165 (2016).
7. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Getting Real About Procedure: Changing How We
Think, Write, and Teach About American Civil Procedure, JOTWELL (June 9, 2021),
https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/getting-real-about-procedure-changing-how-we-think-writeand-teach-about-american-civil-procedure/ (noting “[a]busive debt-collection practices” in
state and local courts); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0020/13376/civiljusticereport-2015.pdf (documenting the large number of debt-collection and
eviction cases on state court dockets).
8. For a small sampling of the vast literature criticizing arbitration in these terms,
see MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 19-32 (2013); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2808, 2839-40,
2863-74 (2015); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1247 (2009); and Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631 (2005). See also Martin H. Malin, Focusing on an Often-Neglected Player in the Mandatory
Arbitration Game, JOTWELL (Nov. 5, 2020), https://worklaw.jotwell.com/focusing-on-an-oftenneglected-player-in-the-mandatory-arbitration-game/ (describing corporate parties’ “abusive”
arbitration tactics).
9. As these examples suggest, litigation abuse is not seen solely as a feature of “big,”
complex cases. To be sure, studies show that certain practices regarded as abusive, such as
expensive and burdensome discovery, are largely limited to such cases. See Linda S.
Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the
Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, The
Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 684 (1998); Judith
A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785
(1998); Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 525 (1998). But other kinds of abuse are alleged to occur even in “small,” ordinary cases.
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wars over the legitimacy of certain types of lawsuits and of the
American civil justice system itself. On this deflationary view,
accusations of litigation abuse simply signal the accuser’s intense
political disagreement with the underlying rights being asserted or
the specific procedural actions being taken. I think it’s hard to deny
that allegations of procedural wrongdoing perform this rhetorical
function in much contemporary discourse about civil justice. And
yet, the concept of litigation abuse, I aim to show, still has
independent content.
In this Article, I argue that the concept of abuse in fact has deep
roots in the normative structure of civil procedure’s doctrinal
apparatus for regulating parties’ litigation conduct. By uncovering
that structure, we can better understand how civil procedure
doctrine shapes evaluations of party behavior both within civil
litigation and in the broader legal and political culture. And that
more nuanced understanding, in turn, might help us to begin to
reframe debates about civil justice in less charged and more
productive ways.
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of allegations of abusive
litigation practices in civil justice debates, prominent theories of
civil justice have had relatively little to say about what, exactly, it
might mean to abuse the civil justice system. The civil procedure
scholars who have directly considered the question have tended to
eschew precise definitions of “abuse,” instead evaluating
procedural rules that regulate parties’ litigation conduct in terms of
how well they achieve some kind of optimal “balance” between the
goals of incentivizing desirable lawsuits and litigation tactics and
deterring undesirable ones (with different scholars, of course,
having very different notions of which lawsuits and tactics are in
fact desirable).10 According to this approach, to abuse the civil
justice system is simply to violate a procedural rule—whether by
filing a lawsuit or by employing some litigation procedure—that’s
calibrated to maximize the net benefits of litigation. Abuse is thus
reduced to sub-optimal litigation conduct.11 Such a conception of

10. Engstrom, supra note 6, at 646, 690; see also, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, The Virtues of
Complexity: Judge Marrero’s Systemic Account of Litigation Abuse, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 266
(2018) (urging judges to adopt “techniques for altering the cost-benefit analysis under which
lawyers too frequently choose strategies that add cost and delay”).
11. See, e.g., Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
1599, 1601, 1645–70 (2016) (equating litigation abuse with any practice that undermines
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procedural wrongdoing resonates with an older scholarly literature
that employed economic cost-benefit analysis and probability
theory to distinguish “frivolous” lawsuits from merely meritless
ones.12 It also accords with scholars’ prevailing understanding of
civil litigation more generally, according to which the primary
function of civil litigation is the “private enforcement” of
governmental regulatory “policy.”13 If a lawsuit is an act of private
enforcement, with the plaintiff serving as a “private attorney
general,”14 then it seems natural to define “abuse” as any litigation
conduct that frustrates, or fails to sufficiently advance, regulatory
goals. Such instrumental accounts of procedural wrongdoing only
feed the widespread impression that abuse talk does no
independent work in civil procedure, but rather merely
recapitulates policy judgments in more morally laden terms.
But the concept of abuse, this Article reveals, turns out to play
a much more fundamental—and much more complex—role in civil
procedure’s approach to regulating party behavior. Concerns about
abuse, if not the exact term, permeate the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and other procedural doctrines. And while some of
those rules and doctrines do indeed require parties to minimize the
costs of their litigation conduct, that’s not how civil procedure
always, or even primarily, conceptualizes abuse of the civil justice
system. Many other rules, I show, define procedural wrongdoing
not (solely) in terms of the effects of litigation conduct, but rather in
terms of parties’ motivations, forbidding parties to act with certain
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1’s ambition “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding”).
12. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997);
Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 18586 (2000); Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability
and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 68 (1996). In a similar vein, scholars employed game theory
to analyze the problem of “discovery abuse,” understood as a subset of the general problem
of litigation abuse. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal
Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 452–54 (1994); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 63–65 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 641 (1989); John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb:
The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569 (1989).
For an historical overview of efforts to curb perceived discovery abuse, see generally Richard
L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747 (1998).
13. See generally, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010); Stephen B. Burbank,
Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637 (2013).
14. For a taxonomy of the various ideas associated with the term “private attorney
general,” see generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and
Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2127 (2004).
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motives or for certain reasons. According to these rules, which I call
motivation-sensitive restrictions, the very same litigation conduct can
either constitute procedural wrongdoing or not, depending on a
party’s motivations for engaging in it. My main analytical aims in
this Article are to call attention to the motivation-sensitive
restrictions as a distinct category of procedural rule, to elucidate
their formal structure and substantive content, and to compare
them with motivation-based rules in other areas of the law.
Normatively, this Article suggests that the motivation-sensitive
restrictions have ambiguous consequences for civil justice. On the
one hand, the restrictions can foster a thin but nevertheless valuable
form of procedural civic virtue, prodding parties to attend to
important public values even as they pursue their own private ends
through the civil justice system. On the other hand, precisely
because they focus on parties’ subjective purposes, the motivationsensitive restrictions risk inflaming public discourse about civil
justice by inviting participants in policy debates to transmute their
disagreements into moralized accusations of abuse or bad faith. I
doubt that we can reap the benefits of the motivation-sensitive
restrictions for civil practice without incurring the costs to our
politics of civil justice. The best we can probably do is to try to
mitigate the latter by emphasizing the relatively modest demands
imposed by the motivation-sensitive restrictions—the fact that such
rules require parties only to abjure certain illicit purposes rather
than to become primarily public-regarding in their litigation
behavior. Given this limited ambition, policy advocates overreach
when they attempt to parlay civil procedure’s professed concern
with litigation abuse into sweeping aspersions against whole
groups of litigants or whole categories of legal claims. A more finegrained account of civil procedure’s approach to regulating party
conduct thus might provide the necessary conceptual resources to
help to confine abuse talk to its duly circumscribed, but still
potentially salutary, role in debates about civil justice.
This Article’s analysis of civil procedure’s motivationsensitive restrictions also sheds new light on leading theories of
civil justice, which have largely glossed over the doctrinal
infrastructure for addressing procedural wrongdoing. In contrast
to the “private enforcement” model espoused by most civil
procedure scholars, the motivation-sensitive restrictions (modestly)
limit the purposes plaintiffs may pursue through civil litigation but
203
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make no systematic attempt to ensure that plaintiffs promote rather
than subvert governmental regulatory policy, belying common
portrayals of plaintiffs as stand-ins for the state—“private attorneys
general.”15 But the restrictions also expose an underappreciated
public dimension of prominent theories of private law, which tend
to emphasize plaintiffs’ individual agency and autonomy in
seeking redress for the wrongs allegedly committed against them,
irrespective of their reasons for doing so.16 The motivation-sensitive
restrictions curb that autonomy precisely by regulating parties’
reasons for taking certain actions during civil litigation, limitations
that are hard to justify without adverting to the kinds of “public”
considerations that many private law theorists downplay.
Considered in light of civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions, the civil justice system proves to be both more private
and more public than how it’s generally understood.
I elaborate these arguments in three Parts, which seek to bridge
the technicalities of civil procedure doctrine and the abstractions of
private law theory and political theory. Part I constructs an
extensive, if not exhaustive, typology of the various restrictions that
civil procedure and adjacent doctrinal areas impose on parties’
conduct during civil litigation. While I distinguish these restrictions
along several different axes, the main contrast I draw is between (a)
those restrictions that define procedural wrongdoing objectively as
any unreasonable, inefficient, or unduly burdensome litigation
conduct and (b) those that define procedural wrongdoing
subjectively as any act taken during litigation for an improper
purpose or with an improper motive—the motivation-sensitive
restrictions. Despite their importance for civil practice, the
motivation-sensitive restrictions have gone underexamined in civil
procedure scholarship, which has focused on the former, efficiencybased restrictions, as exemplified by the prominent debate over the
recently reemphasized “proportionality” requirement for
discovery.17 Examples of the motivation-sensitive restrictions
include Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11’s “improper purpose”
prong and analogous provisions of the discovery rules, federal
15. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Section III.C.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see, e.g., Patricia Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff
Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of
the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1085–86 (2015); Adam N. Steinman,
The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 Emory L.J. 1 (2016).

204

4.SHAPIRO.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

205

12/10/22 7:11 PM

Procedural Wrongdoing

courts’ “inherent” authority to sanction parties for “bad-faith”
litigation conduct, the abuse-of-process tort, and jurisdictional
doctrines forbidding “fraudulent” joinder and removal.18 As this
illustrative list suggests, the motivation-sensitive restrictions are
themselves hardly homogenous, differing in terms of the litigation
procedures they regulate and the motivations they preclude (or, in
a few cases, mandate). But what they all have in common is that
they prohibit litigation conduct that would otherwise be perfectly
permissible, simply because of the reasons for which a party
engages in it.
In Part II, I draw on several different theoretical frameworks to
analyze this distinctive feature of the motivation-sensitive
restrictions, as well as to begin to identify some of the purposes or
motives such restrictions condemn. Insofar as they predicate the
permissibility of litigation conduct on parties’ motivations, the
motivation-sensitive restrictions can helpfully be compared with
prohibitions against disparate-treatment discrimination, which
similarly proscribe otherwise-permissible actions based on the
reasons for which they’re performed. The motivation-sensitive
restrictions also parallel prohibitions against disparate-treatment
discrimination in largely excluding objectionable purposes, rather
than compelling laudable ones. As such, the motivation-sensitive
restrictions leave parties significant room to pursue their own,
potentially self-interested ends through the civil justice system.
Rather than demand that parties become public-regarding
stewards of governmental regulatory policy, they require parties
merely to refrain from invoking litigation for purposes that violate
public values integral to the proper functioning of the civil justice
system. The public values that the motivation-sensitive restrictions
safeguard are multifarious, and I don’t attempt a comprehensive
catalog here, but we can begin to trace the normative content of the
motivation-sensitive restrictions to traditional principles of equity
and various substantive doctrines in both private and public law.
The motivation-sensitive restrictions thus represent an important
avenue through which public values penetrate civil litigation even
in disputes between private parties. By insisting that parties abstain
from acting on motivations that would require the state to deploy
its coercive apparatus on grounds it can’t condone, the restrictions

18.

See infra Section I.B.
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indirectly prod parties to honor important public values when
exercising the significant power and discretion they enjoy in civil
litigation—irrespective of the resulting “balance” between
meritorious and meritless claims.19
Part III considers some of the normative consequences of the
motivation-sensitive restrictions for civil practice and public
discourse about civil justice issues more generally. Within civil
litigation, the motivation-sensitive restrictions can have the
beneficial effect of cultivating a kind of procedural civic virtue in
parties. If civic virtue traditionally consists in a disposition to
promote the common good of the political community, procedural
civic virtue is thinner, manifesting as an acceptance of the necessity
to sometimes subordinate one’s self-interest to important public
values. The motivation-sensitive restrictions can foster such
acquiescence by requiring not just outward conformity with the
conditions imposed on the various powers that civil litigation
confers on parties, but a (partially) clear conscience when exercising
those powers—that is, a conscience untainted by motives inimical
to important public values. The intense focus of the motivationsensitive restrictions on parties’ subjective purposes, however,
has a potentially detrimental flip side when it comes to the
politics of civil justice. While any strong causal claim would be
speculative at best, it seems plausible that the motivationsensitive restrictions can contribute to a political culture in which
charges of illicit purposes and bad faith pervade public discourse
about civil justice issues. Nor are any such discursive effects
likely to be politically neutral: given the current political economy
of civil justice debates, powerful interests can distort civil
procedure’s concern with parties’ motivations in an effort to
delegitimize individuals’ attempts to seek recourse for the wrongs
allegedly committed against them. At the same time, though,
an exclusive focus on political economy risks occluding the
normative structure of the motivation-sensitive restrictions,
which bespeaks a more measured anxiety about litigation abuse
than much of the rhetoric of contemporary civil justice debates
implies. We may well be in a better position to resist the most
exaggerated claims of litigation abuse if we follow civil procedure’s
motivation-sensitive restrictions in conceptualizing the civil justice

19.
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system as a hybrid public-private institution, as opposed to either
the substitute for public regulation depicted by many civil
procedure scholars or the forum for private dispute resolution
depicted by many private law scholars.
But wherever one prefers to strike the balance between “public”
and “private” in the civil justice context, any theory of civil justice
will remain incomplete unless it explains not only the animating
principles of the civil justice system, but also the limits the system
imposes on party conduct. By accusing certain groups of litigants
of misusing the civil justice system, those levelling the accusations
necessarily, if implicitly, presuppose some account of what it
means to properly use that system. Procedural wrongdoing,
together with the rules that civil procedure employs to curb it, thus
constitutes a kind of mirror image of a well-functioning civil justice
system—and, as such, a window into the nature and purposes of
civil justice.
I. DEFINING PROCEDURAL WRONGDOING
Before analyzing and evaluating the motivation-sensitive
restrictions in subsequent Parts, I seek in this Part to situate the
restrictions in the broader constellation of civil procedure’s
regulations of litigation conduct. The pervasive rhetoric of “abuse”
in contemporary debates about civil justice can often seem
untethered from any doctrinal foundation. In fact, civil
procedure—by which I mean to include not only the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, but all bodies of law that constitute and govern
the litigation process—has developed an extensive regime for
regulating parties’ conduct during civil litigation and combatting
abuse of the civil justice system. That regime employs a range of
definitions of procedural wrongdoing and a range of strategies for
policing it. In its more hortatory mode, civil procedure enumerates
lofty aspirations for the system to pursue and exhorts parties to
heed them in their litigation conduct. That is the strategy
embodied, most prominently, in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1,
which admonishes parties and lawyers as well as courts to
“construe[], administer[], and employ[]” all the Rules so as “to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
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action and proceeding.”20 But most of civil procedure’s other
restrictions on litigation conduct have bite, forbidding or requiring
specific behavior and authorizing the imposition of (potentially
severe) sanctions for violations.
Focusing on these latter restrictions, section I.A classifies them
along several different dimensions. Most significantly, the
restrictions proscribe a broad spectrum of wrongdoing, spanning
objective wrongs such as unreasonable or unduly burdensome
litigation practices, deliberate disobedience of court orders, and
subjective wrongs defined in terms of parties’ motives or reasons
for engaging in particular litigation conduct. Section I.B then homes
in on this last category—the motivation-sensitive restrictions.
A. Dimensions of Procedural Wrongdoing
Scholars tend to speak of litigation “abuse” as a single, monolithic
category, but civil procedure actually recognizes several distinct forms
of procedural wrongdoing and contains a corresponding variety of
restrictions on litigation conduct. This section develops a taxonomy
of those restrictions, distinguishing them along four different
dimensions: (1) the identity of the wrongdoer; (2) the identity of the
wronged; (3) the procedural mode of wrongdoing; and (4) the
substantive definition of the wrongdoing.
1. Parties vs. Lawyers
Civil procedure’s restrictions on litigation conduct differ in terms
of whose actions they regulate, with the potential perpetrators of
procedural wrongdoing being either the parties themselves or their
lawyers. Many recent accounts of litigation abuse have focused on
the conduct of lawyers,21 and understandably so. When a party is
represented in litigation, she must act through her lawyer, who is
thus the one most directly positioned to either follow or violate
various procedural rules. Lawyers are also subject to special duties
to uphold certain public values underlying the legal system in

20. The Rule provides only that all the other Rules “should be” so construed,
administered, and employed, rather than imposing any kind of enforceable obligation. FED.
R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., Yablon, supra note 10, at 233–34 (purporting to offer a general account of
“litigation abuse” but quickly reducing the issue to one of “lawyers’ litigation tactics”
(emphasis added)).
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virtue of their role as “officers of the court”22 as well as their
subjection to rules of professional ethics23—an additional set of
obligations constraining their litigation behavior.
Civil procedure likewise contains several restrictions that apply
directly and exclusively to lawyers, such as the federal statute
authorizing courts to sanction any lawyer—but not a party—“who
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously.”24 Other rules, while regulating parties and lawyers
alike, single out lawyers for special obligations, and special
liability to sanctions when they violate them.25 For example,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires either a lawyer or, if
unrepresented, a party to sign any (non-discovery-related)
“paper” submitted to the court,26 and in signing the paper or
otherwise “presenting” it to the court, one makes certain
representations that can elicit sanctions if they prove false.27
Although represented parties as well as their lawyers can be
sanctioned for violations of Rule 11,28 only lawyers (and
unrepresented parties) can face monetary sanctions for violating the
specific representation that “the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions [made in the paper] are warranted by existing law or by
a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law.”29 Represented parties, the
22. See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 143 (1986) (“The invocation of counsel as
officer of the court is designed to constrain the excessive amalgamation of the lawyer’s
interest with that of his client and to forestall the transformation of privately managed
litigation into a melee of self-seeking.”).
23. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1–3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). For
arguments connecting such professional obligations to lawyers’ general duty to uphold the
rule of law, see John Gardner, The Twilight of Legality, 43 AUSTRALASIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 1
(2019); and W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2018).
25. For an argument that Rule 11, in particular, has “federalized” the regulation of
lawyers, see Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV.
959. See also Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994) (predicting
an increasing “federalization” of legal ethics). For a more general account of the ways in
which procedural rules and other “court-supervised law” allow courts to regulate lawyers,
see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO
ST. L.J. 73 (2009).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
28. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A). Other rules restrict lawyers’
conduct more indirectly. For example, Rule 23 enumerates various factors courts should
consider in deciding whether to approve a class action settlement, including whether class
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idea seems to be, shouldn’t incur sanctions for the frivolous legal
arguments advanced by their lawyers.
Most of civil procedure’s regulations of litigation conduct,
however, apply equally to parties and lawyers. Consider again
Rule 11. With the exception of violations of the representation
regarding a paper’s legal arguments, “the court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that
violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.”30 If, for
instance, a party was acting for an “improper purpose” in
instructing her lawyer to make a particular filing,31 the lawyer may
be sanctioned, but so may the party, as the one ultimately
“responsible for the violation.”32 The rule functions in such cases as
a direct regulation of parties’ litigation conduct. But even when a
court exercises its discretion to sanction only the lawyer for a
violation, Rule 11 still incentivizes lawyers to assess their clients’
“purposes” and thus functions as an indirect regulation of parties’
conduct. Only when a lawyer takes some step without her client’s
knowledge or approval do sanctions regimes such as Rule 11’s
regulate the conduct of lawyers alone.33
Within civil procedure’s framework for regulating litigation
conduct, then, we find a shadow regime of party ethics, with rules

counsel adequately represented the class members and whether the settlement was
negotiated at arm’s length—considerations that derivatively impose obligations on both
class and defense counsel. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(A)–(B); see 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797.1 (3d ed.
2002) (explaining that the factors seek to determine whether there was collusion between
class and defense counsel); 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:48
(5th ed. 2011) (similar).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
32. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & A.
BENJAMIN SPENCER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1336.2 (4th ed. 2008) (“As the text
of the rule and cases applying it make clear, the district court’s discretion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 includes the power to impose sanctions on the client alone, solely on
the counsel for one of the parties, a law firm, or on any combination of the three . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)). Some courts, however, are loath to sanction represented parties,
notwithstanding Rule 11’s clear authorization to do so. See id.
33. See, e.g., St. Charles Health Sys. v. Oregon Fed’n Nurses & Health Pro.’s, No. 6:21cr-304-MC, slip op. at 6 n.4 (D. Or. Dec. 16, 2021) (sanctioning the lawyer rather than the
party for “bad-faith” litigation conduct on the ground that the party “was entitled to rely on
experienced, high-priced counsel for advice”); Avery v. E&M Servs., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-258,
2020 WL 7364974, at *3 (D.N.D. Dec. 15, 2020) (declining to sanction a party under the
discovery rules for his lawyer’s misconduct during a deposition because the party hadn’t
“endorsed or condoned” the lawyer’s actions).
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that restrict parties’ conduct directly or, by constraining their
lawyers, derivatively.34
2. Opposing Parties vs. The System
Just as a restriction on litigation conduct can have two different
addressees, so can a restriction seek to protect from procedural
wrongdoing two different beneficiaries: the perpetrator’s opponent
or the civil justice system as a whole. There are a few vestiges of the
view that the opposing party is the primary victim of litigation
misconduct—most notably, the torts of wrongful institution of civil
proceedings (the civil analogue of malicious prosecution) and
abuse of process, both of which purport to remedy the “private
harm” resulting from certain forms of procedural wrongdoing.35
Most of the restrictions found within civil procedure doctrine
itself, by contrast, conceive of procedural wrongdoing as a public
wrong to the civil justice system rather than a private wrong to the
opposing party. For one thing, many restrictions don’t require a
finding of harm or prejudice as a prerequisite for sanctions, or if
they do, they focus on the wrongdoing’s harmful consequences for
the proper functioning of the civil justice system.36 For another,
even when procedural wrongdoing does harm or prejudice the
other party, the sanctions imposed often purport not to remedy the
injury, but only to deter future wrongdoing. Rule 11 sanctions, for
instance, may be no greater than necessary to achieve specific and
general deterrence, and the rule’s preferred sanctions are fines
payable to the court rather than payments to cover the opposing
party’s attorney’s fees, which may be ordered only in rare
circumstances.37 While sanctions imposed for the sake of deterrence

34. Cf. Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System
Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1397 (2008) (“I . . . fail to see why the moral accountability
of the citizen-client is not sufficient for those concerned with the moral consequences of
lawyers’ vicarious action for the clients they represent.”).
35. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 585
(2d ed. 2011). I discuss these torts in more detail in the next section. See infra Section I.B.
36. See, e.g., 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284 nn.36–38 (3d ed. 2002) (identifying factors courts
consider in choosing sanctions for violations of the discovery rules).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) and advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; 5A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 1336.3. By contrast, while courts may use their inherent power
to award attorney’s fees as a sanction for “bad-faith” litigation conduct, such a fee award
must be purely compensatory, limited to the fees the other party incurred because of the
misconduct. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1184–86 (2017).
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may, of course, incidentally compensate the other party, the fact
that the sanctions’ official purpose remains deterrence reflects a
conception of procedural wrongdoing as a public wrong to the civil
justice system.
3. Plaintiffs vs. Defendants
There are myriad ways to perpetrate procedural wrongdoing,
and civil procedure’s restrictions on litigation conduct accordingly
govern the full range of litigation procedures. A few restrictions
apply to procedures typically invoked either only by plaintiffs,
such as the requirements for pleading allegations in a complaint,38
or only by defendants, such as the conditions for waiving service of
process39 and the requirements for responding to the allegations in
the complaint.40 But most of the restrictions are symmetric, in that
they apply to procedures that are equally available to plaintiffs and
defendants—at least as a formal matter, even if certain procedures
have different practical significance on different sides of the “v.”
Some of the symmetric restrictions regulate the manner in which
parties and their lawyers must participate in the litigation process,
such as the rule authorizing sanctions for failing to appear at,
prepare for, or participate in the pretrial conference.41 Most of the
other symmetric restrictions limit the use of discretionary powers
invoked by plaintiffs and defendants alike. Rule 11 thus applies to
the submission of any (non-discovery-related) “pleading, written
motion, or other paper,” while either side faces sanctions for
misconduct committed during discovery.42 To be sure, Rule 11 has
morphed over the decades largely in response to the perceived
abuses of plaintiffs,43 and plaintiffs typically have greater need for
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P.23.1(b) (pleading requirements for
derivative actions).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d).
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(A)–(B).
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 37.
43. Most notably, Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to combat a purported profusion of
“frivolous” lawsuits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
Many scholars, however, criticized courts for imposing sanctions under the revised rule
inconsistently across different categories of plaintiffs and worried that the risk of sanctions
deterred potential plaintiffs from bringing meritorious lawsuits. See Stephen B. Burbank, The
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1937
(1989); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11: Some “Chilling” Problems
in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1339–43 (1986);
William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1015-17 (1988). Rule 11 was
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discovery given information asymmetries.44 But whether plaintiff
or defendant, a party exercises the various powers conferred on her
during civil litigation subject to certain limits—and under the threat
of sanctions for exceeding those limits.
4. Objective vs. Subjective
Finally, and most significantly, civil procedure’s restrictions on
litigation conduct differ in terms of how they define procedural
wrongdoing—and, in particular, whether they define the
proscribed conduct objectively or subjectively. I first focus on the
objective restrictions and then turn to the subjective restrictions in
section I.B.
The objective restrictions prohibit litigation conduct that’s
inefficient in the sense of being “unduly burdensome,” excessively
costly, or otherwise unjustified—with respect to either the
opposing party or the civil justice system (though again, even when
the opposing party bears most of the costs associated with
inefficient litigation conduct, the wrong is often regarded as one to
the civil justice system as a whole).45 The rules thus require
defendants to avoid increasing the costs associated with service of
process46 and both parties to reduce the costs of construing their
pleadings.47 Parties must also have “good cause” to seek any

significantly revised in 1993 largely to address these kinds of concerns, see Carl Tobias,
The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 171 (1995), though it continues to be
associated primarily with the litigation conduct of plaintiffs, as when scholars invoke
sanctions as a preferable alternative to other plaintiff-focused measures aimed at curbing
abusive litigation practices, such as heightened pleading standards, see, e.g., A. Benjamin
Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1710, 1722, 1732–33 (2013).
44. See Yablon, supra note 10, at 238 n.14 (“In big case litigation with information
asymmetries, complaints that focus on ‘overdiscovery’ or ‘fishing expeditions’ usually view
plaintiffs’ counsel as the source of such problems. When the concerns allege delay and
document destruction, it is usually defense counsel who are identified as the culprits.”).
45. See supra Section I.A.2.
46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1) (imposing on defendants “a duty to avoid unnecessary
expenses of serving the summons”); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2) (requiring a defendant who,
“without good cause,” refuses a plaintiff’s proper request to waive service to pay expenses
associated with service).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(2) (“A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the
allegation.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1) (“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (motion for a more definite statement). The rules impose a similar
requirement for answering requests for admission during discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P.
36(a)(4) (“A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the matter . . . .”).

213

4.SHAPIRO.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/10/22 7:11 PM

48:1 (2022)

extension of time from the court,48 and they must have adequate
legal49 and factual50 support for all the contentions made in their
filings, as well as comparable support for their discovery requests.51
The discovery rules are replete with similar requirements: parties
must have “good cause” for seeking an extension of time in which
to make the mandatory pretrial disclosures to their opponent52 and
face sanctions for any failure to make those disclosures that isn’t
“substantially justified”;53 they may request during discovery only
information that’s “proportional to the needs of the case,” with
proportionality defined in terms of several objective factors;54
they must show “good cause” to obtain electronically stored
information that’s not “reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost”55 and take “reasonable” steps to preserve such
information in anticipation of litigation;56 they must pay their
opponent’s expenses if they lose on a motion to compel discovery
unless their position was “substantially justified”;57 and they must
avoid proliferating the costs associated with deposing their
opponent and third-party witnesses.58 Finally, under Rule 68’s
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3)–(4). These provisions can be understood as imposing
purely objective requirements at least in cases in which any violation is merely “negligent”
rather than “willful.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
Further confirming the requirements’ objective nature, courts recognize no “good-faith”
defense for these provisions. See 5A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 1335 & n.6.
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(i) (requiring discovery requests to have legal support);
26(g)(1)(B)(iii) (prohibiting discovery that’s unreasonable or unduly burdensome or
expensive); 26(g)(3) (authorizing sanctions for violations of the foregoing provisions).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(B).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(ii) (requiring the court
to limit discovery if it’s “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” or if “the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery
in the action”).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii), (a)(5)(B). A position is “substantially justified” so
long as “reasonable people could debate” it. 8B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 36, § 2288 & n.31.
58. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2) (authorizing sanctions for “a person who
impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent” during an oral
deposition); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(g) (authorizing sanctions for a party who fails to show up
to a deposition or to get a nonparty deponent to appear); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3) (requiring
a party to pay the expenses associated with a failure to attend a deposition or answer
interrogatories unless the failure was “substantially justified”); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1)
(requiring parties to “take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense
on a person subject to [a] subpoena”).
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offer-of-judgment procedure, if a plaintiff rejects a defendant’s
pretrial settlement offer and ends up securing a judgment no more
favorable than the spurned offer, she must pay the defendant’s
post-offer litigation costs.59
All of these rules require parties to modify their litigation
conduct so as to avoid imposing excessive costs on their opponent
and the civil justice system, with courts determining which costs
count as excessive according to various objective standards. And
because the rules all define procedural wrongdoing objectively,
they are all amenable to economic cost-benefit analysis, and thus
accord with the prevailing conception of procedural wrongdoing
among civil procedure scholars.60
Other rules, though still employing objective definitions of
procedural wrongdoing, don’t seek to minimize the costs of parties’
litigation practices so much as to preserve courts’ control over the
proceedings. In particular, various rules allow a court to sanction
parties and lawyers for disobedience of its orders, including its
scheduling and other pretrial orders61 and its discovery orders.62
Courts, of course, also possess inherent power to punish
contempt.63 These restrictions on litigation conduct are objective
because they make liability to sanctions turn on the fact of
disobedience of a court order rather than any of the subjective
mental states of the person who disobeyed; disobedience of a court
order, for example, need not have been “willful” to constitute (civil)
contempt.64 At the same time, such restrictions generally make no
attempt to account for the costs and benefits of disobedience,65 in
contrast to many of civil procedure’s other objective restrictions on
litigation conduct.

59. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d).
60. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(C).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
63. See FED. R. CIV. P. 70(e); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (19 Wall.) (1874); 11A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2960 (3d ed. 2002).
64. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 63, § 2960 & n.60.
65. But see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (excusing disobedience of discovery orders if
“substantially justified”).
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B. Party Motivations and Procedural Wrongdoing
Less prominent in extant accounts of procedural wrongdoing is
another set of rules and doctrines that define the litigation conduct
they prohibit subjectively, in terms of the motivations of the
individuals who engage in it. I thus label these rules motivationsensitive restrictions. By motivations, I mean the reasons for which an
individual performs a particular action.66 Motivations, so
understood, differ from incentives, which are the focus of other
accounts of procedural wrongdoing67: if incentives are (some of) the
reasons for which an individual might be inclined to act,
motivations are the reasons for which she does in fact act;
incentives become motivations only when an individual
“responds” to them. All the rules considered in this section make
the permissibility of litigation conduct turn at least partly on the
motivations with which individuals engage in it—and often
exclusively, without regard to the conduct’s consequences.
Many of the motivation-sensitive restrictions forbid parties and
their lawyers to engage in litigation conduct for certain illegitimate
reasons. Perhaps the most familiar example (and one to which I’ll
return frequently in the remainder of this Article) is Rule 11’s
“improper purpose” prong, which prohibits parties and their
lawyers from presenting a “paper” for “any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation.”68 The provision’s references to “unnecessary
delay” and “needlessly increase[d] . . . cost[s]” might evoke the
objective restrictions considered in section I.A.3. In contrast to those
other restrictions, however, Rule 11’s “improper purpose” prong
imposes no freestanding duty to avoid delay or otherwise minimize
litigation costs; one violates the provision not whenever one
happens to unnecessarily delay the proceedings or needlessly
increase litigation costs, but only when one makes such delay or
waste one’s purpose in presenting a paper to the court. Most courts
have accordingly emphasized that the “improper purpose” prong,
unlike Rule 11’s other provisions, imposes a subjective requirement,
66. I provide a more detailed account of the kinds of reasons the motivation-sensitive
restrictions proscribe in the next Part. See infra Section II.A.
67. See, e.g., Marrero, supra note 11 (developing an account of abusive litigation
practices based on the various financial and professional incentives faced by lawyers);
Yablon, supra note 10, at 241–51 (following Judge Marrero’s lead).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
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akin to a prohibition on bad-faith litigation conduct.69 Some courts
do occasionally describe the provision as an objective requirement,
but usually in the sense of demanding objective evidence of a
violation, which is perfectly consistent with a subjective standard
of conduct.70 What’s more, most courts treat the “improper
purpose” prong as a distinct requirement from Rule 11’s other,
objective requirements, in that one can be sanctioned for acting
with an “improper purpose” even if one’s legal and factual
contentions are nonfrivolous.71 The provision thus predicates the
permissibility of certain litigation actions exclusively on the reasons
for which they’re performed.
In this respect, Rule 11’s “improper purpose” prong is hardly
anomalous. Many other procedural rules, both within the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and in adjacent bodies of doctrine,
prohibit parties and their lawyers from engaging in litigation
conduct for certain illegitimate reasons. Under the Rules, parties
and their lawyers are subject to an “improper purpose” provision for
discovery requests that’s analogous to Rule 11’s;72 they may seek
protective orders against discovery that constitutes “annoyance” or
“oppression,” terms that bespeak an implicit mental state on the part
of the party seeking the discovery;73 they may move to terminate or
limit an oral deposition “on the ground that it is being conducted
69. See 5A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 1335 & n.7.
70. See id. nn.26–27.
71. See, e.g., FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 584 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a
plaintiff “would violate Rule 11 if it filed a case that it reasonably thought had merit, but
pursued it in a manner calculated to increase the costs of defense,” thus rejecting the view
that “the filing of a paper for an improper purpose is immunized from Rule 11 sanctions
simply because it is well grounded in fact and law”); Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc.,
332 F.3d 796, 803–07 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (upholding sanctions against a lawyer who
executed a judgment in a manner deliberately designed to embarrass the other party,
irrespective of whether the lawyer’s application for a writ of execution had been
nonfrivolous); Szabo Food Serv. Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987)
(approving Rule 11 sanctions for “filing a colorable suit for the purpose of imposing expense
on the defendant rather than for the purpose of winning”). Those courts that have dissented
from this view have tended to do so only when the “paper” at issue was a plaintiff’s
complaint. See, e.g. Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that sanctions
would be inappropriate where the plaintiff’s complaint was nonfrivolous, even if she had
filed it partly for an improper purpose); Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d
1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a “determination of improper purpose must be
supported by a determination of frivolousness when a complaint is at issue”).
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that a discovery request, response, or
objection must “not [be] interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation”).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
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in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or
oppresses the deponent or party”;74 they face heightened sanctions for
spoliating electronically stored information “with the intent to deprive
another party of the information’s use in the litigation”;75 and they can
be sanctioned for submitting an affidavit or declaration at summary
judgment “in bad faith or solely for delay.”76
Beyond the Rules, various statutes and judicially created
doctrines likewise limit the reasons for which parties and their
lawyers may act during civil litigation. Courts, for example, possess
“inherent authority” to sanction “bad-faith” litigation conduct,
where a party acts in bad faith when she acts for the kinds of
purposes deemed “improper” under Rule 11.77 Under the federal
jurisdictional statutes, a defendant has only one year to remove a
state lawsuit to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, unless
the plaintiff acted in “bad faith” to prevent removal.78 And several
substance-specific doctrines forbid parties to act for illegitimate
reasons in the context of particular kinds of lawsuits, from prison
litigation79 to securities80 and antitrust actions.81
Most of the foregoing rules attempt to police parties’ illicit
motivations while the litigation is ongoing, but other rules address

74. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3)(A).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2). Even “gross negligence” isn’t enough to warrant sanctions
under this provision. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
And unlike the other provisions of Rule 37(e), section (e)(2) doesn’t require a finding of
prejudice to the other party. See 8B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 36, § 2284.2 & n.23.
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(h).
77. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42, 46 n.10 (1991).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (2018).
79. Under the so-called “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), a prisoner may not proceed in forma pauperis in federal court if three or more of his
previous lawsuits were dismissed as, among other things, “malicious.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
(2018); see Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1726 (2020) (distinguishing “abusive”
from “simply meritless prisoner suits,” though noting that the PLRA seeks to combat both).
80. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes heightened versions
of Rule 11’s requirements on certain securities lawsuits. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(c) (2018).
81. Under the so-called “sham litigation” doctrine, a business lawsuit will be
regarded as an attempt to violate the antitrust laws, as opposed to a bona fide attempt to
vindicate the plaintiff’s rights, if and only if the lawsuit is both (1) ”objectively baseless,” in
that “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits,” and (2)
motivated by an improper purpose “‘to interfere directly with the business relationships of
a competitor’ . . . through the ‘use [of] the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome
of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.’” Pro. Real Est. Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, FTC v. AbbVie Inc., No. 2:14-cv-05151-HB, slip op. at 32, 36–37, 39 (E.D.
Pa. June 29, 2018) (elaborating the doctrine’s “subjective-intent” element).
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ill-motivated litigation conduct through collateral proceedings,
after the fact. That is the role of the torts of wrongful institution of
civil proceedings and abuse of process. To recover under the former
tort, the plaintiff must show that she was subjected to a prior
lawsuit that lacked “probable cause” and that was filed for an
“improper purpose,” that she suffered an injury as a result, and that
the prior lawsuit was terminated in her favor.82 The elements of the
abuse-of-process tort are similar, except that the wrong consists in
the misuse of any legal process, not just the filing of a lawsuit, and
the prior litigation need not have lacked probable cause or been
terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.83 Although these torts differ
from many of the other motivation-sensitive restrictions in that
they require the opposing party to have suffered some kind of harm
from the abusive litigation conduct,84 I nevertheless include them
here because “in most cases motive or purpose is the centerpiece”
of both torts.85 These torts also recognize even more explicitly than
some of the other motivation-sensitive restrictions that parties can
act with mixed motives, and they accordingly look to parties’

82. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 35, § 592. It’s difficult to recover under this tort, for
several reasons. First, “probable cause” requires “only that the original suitor must believe
in the facts he asserts and that a civil claim is plausible, or he has a good chance at
establishing the case to the satisfaction of judge and jury, or that he ‘may’ have a claim.” Id.
(footnote omitted). Second, a party doesn’t act with an “improper purpose” if she’s merely
negligent, and neither does spite alone count as malicious, though spite plus intent to harass
is sufficient. See id. Third, many states require a showing of some kind of “special injury.”
See id. § 593.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (explaining that
the tort prohibits using any legal process “against another primarily to accomplish a purpose
for which it is not designed”); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 35, § 594 (explaining that a showing
of lack of probable cause isn’t required).
84. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
85. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 35, § 594; see, e.g., Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund
Ins., 337 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2003). I thus disagree with Alan Calnan’s understanding of the
wrongful-litigation tort, according to which it imposes a de facto “probable cause”
requirement on (tort) plaintiffs, subjecting them to liability whenever they file unsupported
claims. See generally ALAN CALNAN, THE RIGHT TO CIVIL DEFENSE IN TORTS (2013). But of
course, lack of probable cause isn’t a sufficient condition for liability under the tort, only a
necessary one. Calnan pays particularly little heed to the improper-purpose element.
The wrongful-litigation and abuse-of-process torts also seem to constitute
counterexamples to Arthur Ripstein’s claim that tort law prescinds from the “ends” for
which individuals act and considers only the “means” they use. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
PRIVATE WRONGS 159–84 (2016); infra notes 272–277 and accompanying text (considering the
compatibility of the motivation-sensitive restrictions with Ripstein’s theory of tort law).
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“predominant” or “primary” purpose in taking particular actions,
rather than their sole one.86
Among the illegitimate reasons that might motivate a party’s
litigation conduct is an intent to deceive the court (beyond the
deceit implicit in any attempt to accomplish an improper purpose).
Rule 11 thus authorizes courts to impose heightened sanctions for
“willful” violations.87 A party may also seek relief from a final
judgment on the ground that it resulted from “fraud . . . ,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,”88 and
courts enjoy inherent power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on
the court.”89 Short of outright fraud, several rules prohibit parties
from engaging in duplicitous conduct designed to achieve ends the
law otherwise forecloses, such as the requirement that a lawsuit “be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest” rather than
some surrogate,90 as well as assorted rules prohibiting “collusive”
practices designed to manufacture jurisdiction in derivative
actions91 or to manufacture92 or defeat diversity jurisdiction.93
86. Thus, for a party to have acted with “malice” or for an “improper purpose,” “the
proceedings must have been initiated or continued primarily for a purpose other than that of
securing the proper adjudication of the claim on which they are based.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (emphasis added). I consider more
extensively how to address the problem of mixed motives in the context of civil litigation in
Part II. See infra notes 134–138 and accompanying text.
87. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3).
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3) (acknowledging the existence of such inherent power).
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1); see 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1541 (3d ed. 2010) (“Arguably, . . . Rule
17(a) performs the useful function of protecting individuals from harassment and multiple
suits by persons who would not be bound by the principles of claim preclusion if they were
not prevented from bringing subsequent actions by a real-party-in-interest rule.”).
91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(2). Though defendants rarely contest this requirement,
and courts tend to police only the most egregious attempts to manufacture federal
jurisdiction. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1830 (3d ed. 2007).
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2018) (“A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil
action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.”); 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3637 (3d ed. 2009) (observing that
the provision “seeks to prevent agreements or transactions that are designed primarily to
manufacture federal diversity jurisdiction”). In applying this provision, most courts
employ a subjective “motivation” or purpose test, though some courts criticize that
approach on the ground that determining parties’ motives is too difficult. See 6A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 90, § 1557.
93. Traditionally, there were few checks on the collusive destruction of diversity, but
courts increasingly look for an intent to defeat diversity jurisdiction by “fraudulently”
joining a nondiverse party. See 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 92, §§ 3639, 3641, 3641.1; cf.,
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In these various contexts, when a party performs an otherwisepermissible action with an intent to deceive or mislead the court,
the rules frequently deem her to be acting for an illegitimate
purpose and prohibit her conduct.
Finally, while most of the motivation-sensitive restrictions
forbid parties to act with certain bad motivations, a few
affirmatively require parties to act with certain good ones. The latter
rules impose that requirement by demanding that parties take
certain actions in “good faith,” understood as a sincere belief in the
reasonableness of one’s conduct. A defendant must, for instance,
have a “good-faith“ basis to make a general denial of the allegations
in the plaintiff’s complaint,94 and a similar requirement applies to a
party’s answers to requests for admission during discovery.95 Other
rules require parties to negotiate in good faith with their opponents,
whether during scheduling and other pretrial conferences,96 before
seeking a protective order during discovery,97 when attempting to
develop a joint discovery plan,98 before seeking to depose a
representative of an organization,99 or before moving for an order
compelling discovery.100 The security requirement for preliminary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders can similarly be
understood as an assurance of a party’s good faith in requesting
e.g., Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987) (listing as the first factor for
courts to consider in deciding whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (2018), to deny a plaintiff’s
request to amend her complaint to join a defendant who would destroy diversity jurisdiction
“the extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction”)
(emphasis added). The case law on so-called “fraudulent joinder” is particularly confused,
with some courts declaring subjective intent “immaterial” and others purporting to
determine whether a nondiverse defendant was joined in “bad faith.” See 14C CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOAN E. STEINMAN, MARY KAY KANE & A. BENJAMIN SPENCER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723.1 & nn.2–3 (rev. 4th ed. 2018). It seems that the
best way to reconcile these conflicting cases is to treat fraudulent joinder as a subjective
wrong while allowing that wrong to be proved through objective evidence, a common
approach throughout the law. For a recent treatment of the related phenomenon of
“fraudulent removal,” see generally Zachary D. Clopton & Alexandra D. Lahav, Fraudulent
Removal, 135 HARV. L. REV. F. 87 (2021).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(3)–(4).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(4).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(B).
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (authorizing sanctions for
violations of the good-faith negotiation requirement).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). More specifically, conferring in good faith is a precondition
for recovering one’s expenses in connection with a motion to compel discovery. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(1)(B) (imposing a similar requirement to
confer in good faith before moving to compel responses to depositions and interrogatories).
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such provisional relief.101 Like the other motivation-sensitive
restrictions, these good-faith requirements define procedural
wrongdoing in terms of parties’ subjective mental states102 but are
more rationally demanding than the former and thus appear less
frequently in the Federal Rules and related doctrines.
* * *
Time and again, procedural rules and doctrines define the
litigation conduct they prohibit subjectively, in terms of the reasons
for which parties act, rather than objectively, in terms of the
reasonableness of parties’ actions. These motivation-sensitive
restrictions treat the very same procedural act—filing a lawsuit,
making a discovery request, and so on—as either wrongful or not,
depending on a party’s reasons for performing it. Because
individuals’ subjective mental states can be difficult to discern,
courts frequently rely on objective, circumstantial evidence of illicit
motives. But that evidentiary practice, common throughout the
law,103 hardly converts a subjective standard of conduct into an
objective one. Nor is the motivation-sensitive restrictions’ concern
with parties’ subjective reasons for action merely didactic;
violations of the restrictions carry significant sanctions, which are
often more severe than those imposed for violations of other
procedural rules.104 Indeed, the motivation-sensitive restrictions
are regarded as so essential to the proper functioning of the civil
justice system that a court may entertain a motion to impose
sanctions for bad-faith litigation conduct even in a case over which
it turns out to lack subject-matter jurisdiction, lest “parties who
101. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c).
102. See, e.g., Naviant Mktg. Sols., Inc. v. Larry Tucker, Inc., 339 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir.
2003) (holding that Rule 37(a)(1)’s good-faith-conferral requirement demands a “sincere
effort,” not just a “token effort,” “‘to secure [requested discovery] without court action’”
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1)). In this respect, civil procedure’s various good-faith
requirements may differ from good-faith requirements in other areas of the law, which often
understand good faith to be at least partly objective. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (construing good faith to contain both objective and
subjective elements).
103. See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, The Limits of Good Faith Analyses: Unraveling and
Redefining Bad Faith in Involuntary Bankruptcy Proceedings, 71 NEB. L. REV. 209, 222 n.44 (1992)
(bankruptcy); Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1223, 1247 (1999) (contract).
104. Contrast, in this regard, constitutional law, where “soft” sanctions such as public
censure predominate over “hard” sanctions for bad-faith conduct. David E. Pozen,
Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 951 (2016).
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abuse the judicial procedures . . . get off scot-free” because of
jurisdictional technicalities.105
And yet, despite their prominence, the motivation-sensitive
restrictions are largely absent from prevailing accounts of
procedural wrongdoing. That’s likely because the restrictions, in
contrast to their objective counterparts, can’t be readily explained
in terms of efficiency or cost-benefit analysis, the dominant
scholarly frameworks for assessing litigation conduct.106 While one
can tell a rather circuitous story in which the motivation-sensitive
restrictions indirectly promote efficiency, the more straightforward
efficiency-based approach would apparently be to jettison the
motivation-sensitive restrictions and evaluate all litigation conduct
objectively for its reasonableness, as many other procedural rules
do.107 If we take civil procedure’s professed concern with parties’
subjective motivations seriously, then we need a different account
of how those motivations can determine the permissibility of
litigation conduct and why they should. The next Part develops
such an account.
II. THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE’S MOTIVATIONSENSITIVE RESTRICTIONS
The motivation-sensitive restrictions are distinguished from civil
procedure’s other limits on parties’ litigation conduct by a focus on
parties’ subjective mental states—their purposes and reasons. But
this feature, of course, hardly renders the restrictions unique in the
broader scheme of legal rules; for instance, many crimes and torts
contain subjective elements. To better apprehend the normative
structure of the motivation-sensitive restrictions, section II.A
compares them with one of the most studied sets of rules that
purport to regulate individuals’ subjective motivations: prohibitions
against disparate-treatment discrimination. This comparison helps
to illuminate the ways in which civil procedure’s motivationsensitive restrictions both resemble and depart from other subjective
legal rules. On the one hand, the motivation-sensitive restrictions
and bans on disparate-treatment discrimination both make the
permissibility of particular actions—whether to, say, fire an

105.
106.
107.

Hyde v. Irish, 962 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2020).
See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
See supra Section I.A.4.
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employee or file a discovery request—turn on the motivations
behind them. On the other hand, notwithstanding that notable
affinity, the motivation-sensitive restrictions also differ from
prohibitions against disparate-treatment discrimination in at least
two important respects. For one, the motivation-sensitive
restrictions target parties’ motives or more ulterior reasons for
action, not only their intentions or more immediate reasons, and
thus probe more deeply into parties’ practical reasoning. For
another, the restrictions proscribe a broader swath of motivations,
not just the grounds traditionally prohibited by antidiscrimination
law. The impermissible motivations nevertheless represent only a
relatively small subset of all the possible motivations behind
parties’ litigation conduct, leaving parties significant latitude to
pursue their own objectives through the civil justice system.
If the motivation-sensitive restrictions exclude only some
motivations, then the crucial question becomes precisely which
motivations are off limits. There turns out to be no neat formula for
distinguishing illegitimate from legitimate reasons for engaging in
various litigation conduct, but as I show in section II.B, we can
begin to glean some of the hallmarks of abusive motivations from
the illustrative lists of “improper purposes” in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and doctrines in adjacent areas of law. Though
variegated, many of the illicit motivations are incompatible with
important public values—values not only that the political
community endeavors to uphold, but the violation of which
must not be allowed to corrupt the state’s coercive apparatus,
including the civil justice system. Such values are grounded in
traditional principles of equity and various substantive bodies of
law, even as they remain continually up for debate in the political
process. Through these myriad sources, the motivation-sensitive
restrictions infuse important public values even into disputes
between private parties.
A. Motivations, Permissibility, and Personal Prerogative
Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions all forbid
parties not simply to engage in certain kinds of litigation conduct,
but to engage in certain kinds of litigation conduct for certain reasons
or purposes. When Rule 11 prohibits presenting any “paper” for an
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“improper purpose,”108 when federal courts sanction parties for acting
in “bad faith,”109 or when they dismiss a case with “fraudulently”
joined parties for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,110 civil procedure
makes the permissibility of parties’ procedural actions turn on the
subjective mental states with which they’re performed; litigation
conduct that would be perfectly permissible when engaged in for a
legitimate reason becomes impermissible when engaged in for an
illegitimate reason. But what, exactly, is the relationship between
parties’ subjective motivations and the forms of procedural
wrongdoing proscribed by the motivation-sensitive restrictions?
And just how intrusively do the restrictions regulate parties’
reasoning, as opposed to their outward behavior?
We can better comprehend the formal structure of civil
procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions by comparing them
with similar restrictions in other areas of the law. Many other legal
rules define wrongdoing in terms of individuals’ subjective mental
states, such that the very same act can be either permissible or not,
depending on the reasons for which it’s performed.111 Perhaps the
most familiar examples of such rules are found in
antidiscrimination law. Consider Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which bans employment discrimination based on race, sex,
and certain other protected characteristics.112 More specifically,
Title VII prohibits two distinct forms of discrimination: (1)
“disparate treatment,” where “[t]he employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,” and (2) “disparate impact,” where
employers adopt “employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.”113 Disparate treatment is distinguished from disparate
impact by the employer’s intent: whereas disparate impact includes
any unjustified employment practice that disproportionately
harms members of certain social groups—irrespective of the
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1); see supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
109. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Stephen Daly, The Aberrant Tort of Lawful Means Conspiracy?, 31 KING’S L.J.
145 (2020) (analyzing the civil conspiracy tort, which creates liability for otherwise-permissible
competitive business tactics when performed with the motive to suppress competition).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
113. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–336 n.15 (1977).
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employer’s intent in adopting the practice—disparate treatment
includes only those adverse employment actions motivated by an
intent to discriminate against an employee based on her race, sex,
or other protected characteristic.114 Prohibitions against disparatetreatment discrimination thus define the particular wrong they
proscribe in terms of the wrongdoer’s subjective mental state; in
contrast to the wrong of disparate impact, the employer’s mental
state partly constitutes the wrong of disparate treatment. And in this
regard, prohibitions against disparate-treatment discrimination
resemble civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions.
Also like the motivation-sensitive restrictions, prohibitions
against disparate-treatment discrimination forbid individuals to act
with certain objectionable subjective mental states, rather than
requiring them to act with certain laudable ones. Both sets of rules,
that is, purport to exclude particular illegitimate reasons from
individuals’ decision-making rather than to mandate the
consideration of particular legitimate reasons. Regarding bans on
disparate-treatment discrimination, Title VII doesn’t require
employers to have some justification before, say, firing their
employees, but rather prohibits them from firing their employees
only for specific reasons (race, sex, and so on); employers remain
free to fire their employees for any other reason or even for no
reason at all (subject to other legal restrictions on employment
practices). As for civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions,
they likewise generally forbid parties to engage in litigation
conduct for specified reasons (harassment, causing undue delay,
and so on), leaving parties free to engage in the same conduct for
any other reasons, even bad ones. A few of the motivation-sensitive
restrictions do go further, requiring parties to perform certain
actions in “good faith.”115 Such requirements demand the presence
of certain legitimate reasons in parties’ decision-making (to wit,
whatever reasons collectively constitute “good faith”), not just the
absence of certain illegitimate reasons.116 But for the most part, the
motivation-sensitive restrictions, like Title VII’s ban on disparate114. See id.
115. See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
116. But cf. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968) (arguing that “good
faith” in contract law “is best understood as an ‘excluder’—it is a phrase which has no
general meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous
forms of bad faith” (footnote omitted)).
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treatment discrimination, define the wrongful actions they prohibit
in terms of specific illicit motivations with which the actions might
be performed.
In forbidding individuals to act with certain subjective mental
states, both the motivation-sensitive restrictions and prohibitions
against disparate-treatment discrimination furnish their subjects
with what Joseph Raz calls “exclusionary reasons.” If a “first-order
reason” is a reason to perform or not to perform a particular action,
then an exclusionary reason is a kind of “second-order reason”—
namely, a “reason to refrain from acting for a [first-order]
reason.”117 When an employer would take her employee’s race or
sex as a reason to fire or demote the employee, Title VII’s ban on
disparate-treatment discrimination directs her to refrain from
acting for that (putative) reason but does not prevent her from
taking the very same action for some other reason. Civil
procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions likewise require
parties to abstain from, say, filing a lawsuit or making a discovery
request when motivated by a desire to harass their opponents or
another “improper purpose,” though not when motivated by any
other consideration.
While the two sets of rules thus function in much the same way,
they differ in terms of the kinds of subjective mental states they
direct their subjects to refrain from acting on—the kinds of firstorder reasons they exclude. More specifically, prohibitions against
disparate-treatment discrimination exclude only certain intentions,
whereas civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions also
exclude certain motives. Both intentions and motives refer to the
reasons for which an individual acts118—the answers a person
could sincerely give when asked, “Why did you do that?”—but the
two kinds of mental states occupy different positions along the
chain of means-ends relationships linking the agent’s action and
her ultimate objective in taking it. Intentions can be understood as
an agent’s more immediate reasons for taking a particular action,119

117. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 39 (2d ed. 1990); see also JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 22–23 (1979).
118. See JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON 39 (1999) (“[T]o identify people’s intentions
one needs to identify their reasons. They fix the intentions.”).
119. Contrast a different notion of intention as an agent’s awareness of the action she’s
taking and its likely consequences. See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS:
PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 19 (2008).
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culminating in “the initiation of [the] action” itself.120 “In
forming . . . an intention,” this conception holds, “the agent ratifies
or endorses a desire in a distinctively practical way by deciding to
bring about what she wants to do.”121 An agent’s motive, by
contrast, is her “ultimate desire for performing” an action, or her
“end in acting.”122 Both intentions and motives are subjective
mental states rather than objective ones, as they both reflect what
“the agent took to be desirable—and hence, presumably,
reasonable—about acting” rather than what she should have found
desirable about acting or what it was in fact reasonable for her to
do.123 At the same time, motives are somewhat further removed
than intentions from the actions they motivate and thus lie at a
deeper level of individuals’ practical reasoning.
Prohibitions against disparate-treatment discrimination focus
only on intentions so understood, defining the wrongs they
proscribe in terms of the most immediate reasons for which
individuals act. When Title VII forbids employers to discriminate
“because of” race, sex, or other protected characteristics, it directs
them not to take any of those characteristics as a reason to treat an
employee less favorably, regardless of the further reasons they
might have for engaging in such conduct. The statute thus
prescinds not only from “the emotional or attitudinal force behind
what was done,” but also from “the further and ultimate intention
with which it was done”124—that is, the employer’s motive.
Whether an employer refuses to hire a minority job applicant in
order to promote white supremacy, to conform to a race-based
stereotype, or to grudgingly appease a racist clientele, she equally
violates Title VII’s ban on disparate-treatment discrimination,
making clear that the prohibited wrong consists in acting on certain
intentions, not with certain motives.

120. STEVEN SVERDLIK, MOTIVE AND RIGHTNESS 33–34 (2011).
121. Id. (emphasis added); cf. John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 229 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (defining an intention as “the
linking of means and ends in a plan or proposal-for-action adopted by choice in preference to
alternative proposals (including to do nothing)”).
122. SVERDLIK, supra note 120, at 19.
123. Id. at 24.
124. John Gardner, On the Ground of Her Sex(uality), 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 167,
181 n.34 (1998).
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Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions, by contrast,
generally do attend to parties’ motives, rather than just to their
intentions. Consider again Rule 11’s “improper purpose” prong,
which forbids parties to present any “paper” for an “improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.”125 Unlike Title VII’s list of prohibited
grounds, Rule 11’s list of illustrative improper purposes doesn’t
identify parties’ most immediate reasons for action; when a party
acts for one of the improper purposes, she always has some other,
more immediate reason for her action, and conversely, she need not
have any improper purpose when she’s acting for one of those more
immediate reasons. All plaintiffs, for instance, file a complaint for
the immediate reason of initiating a lawsuit and compelling the
defendant to respond, on pain of default.126 Acting on that reason
is compatible with a wide range of various further reasons,
including eliciting answers, garnering publicity, and extracting a
settlement, as well as all the “improper purposes” enumerated in
Rule 11. Yet whereas Title VII prohibits acting on some of the
immediate reasons an employer might have to, say, fire an
employee (the employee’s race, sex, and so on), Rule 11 and civil
procedure’s other motivation-sensitive restrictions prohibit acting
on certain further reasons parties might have to present a “paper”
or engage in other litigation conduct. Those further reasons may, of
course, be instrumental to other, still more ulterior reasons.127
For example, a party might seek to “harass” her opponent in order
to exact revenge, extort a monetary payment, or dissipate the
opponent’s resources. But the reasons proscribed by the
motivation-sensitive restrictions—the “improper purposes”—
nonetheless remain more remote than the prohibited grounds in
Title VII, and thus merit the label “motives” to distinguish them
from the latter.
Although civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions
thus define wrongful litigation conduct in terms of different kinds
of subjective mental states from those targeted by bans on
disparate-treatment discrimination, the restrictions might seem to
125. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3, 4, 55.
127. The motivation-sensitive restrictions thus address attempts to use harm as
“leverage”—”as a means of achieving something else”—as well as instances of “animus,” or
a bare desire “to gratify spite.” Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of
Abuse of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1448 (2013).
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suffer from some of the same difficulties that many scholars have
attributed to other purpose-based rules such as those found in
antidiscrimination law. Indeed, one might think that the
motivation-sensitive restrictions are especially vulnerable to those
difficulties precisely because they attend to parties’ motives rather
than intentions. And that vulnerability, in turn, might render the
restrictions much more peripheral to civil procedure’s doctrinal
apparatus for regulating procedural wrongdoing than I’ve
portrayed them to be.
The difficulties supposedly confronting purpose-based rules
are both conceptual and moral, on the one hand, and practical and
evidentiary, on the other. At the conceptual and moral level, some
scholars flatly deny that the moral permissibility of an action can
ever turn directly on the subjective motivations with which it’s
performed; whether an action is permissible, these critics contend,
depends on the balance of objective reasons for and against the
action, not the particular reasons for which an agent subjectively
performs it.128 Such objections, of course, must confront the fact that
purpose-based prohibitions are ubiquitous in the law, with myriad
legal rules purporting to predicate the permissibility of various
actions on the reasons for which they’re actually performed, as
opposed to the reasons for which they could conceivably be
performed.129 There are also cases in which an act intuitively seems
to be rendered impermissible solely in virtue of the subjective
motivations with which it’s performed, including most cases of
employment discrimination—where, after all, the employer takes
an action (firing, demoting, and so on) that would usually be
perfectly unobjectionable but for the fact that it’s motivated by raceor sex-based reasons.130 But be that as it may, the thoroughgoing
conceptual objections to purposed-based prohibitions don’t tell
against civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions. For even
scholars who level such objections concede that subjective
128. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 119, at 8–88 (making this criticism as a matter of
moral theory); DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 138–68 (2008)
(applying the criticism to antidiscrimination law and norms); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 564–66 (2016) (applying the
criticism to constitutional restrictions on legislative action).
129. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Even a Dog: A Response to Professor Fallon, 130 HARV. L.
REV. F. 86 (2016).
130. See Micah Schwartzman, Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy: The Case of the
Travel Ban, in POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: NOMOS LXI 201, 216–19 (Jack Knight & Melissa
Schwartzberg eds., 2019).
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motivations can indirectly affect the permissibility of an action, as
when a power or privilege is conferred on the condition that it not
be exercised for any illegitimate purpose.131 While many of the
procedural powers that civil litigation confers on private parties
might on their face appear to be unqualified,132 we can understand
the motivation-sensitive restrictions to impose further conditions
on the exercise of those powers, conditions that are defined in terms
of parties’ subjective motivations.133
But even accepting that subjective motivations can determine
(directly or indirectly) the permissibility of some kinds of conduct,
one might nonetheless insist that matters are more complicated in
civil procedure. The problem, one might think, lies in the fact that
the motivation-sensitive restrictions define impermissible litigation
conduct in terms of parties’ motives rather than intentions. While
individuals’ most immediate reasons for taking a particular action
may well be relatively discrete and definite, their further reasons
for acting are often multifarious and inchoate. This problem of
“mixed motives” seems to be especially acute in civil litigation,
where a party might act for a complex combination of ulterior
reasons, blending a genuine desire for vindication with baser
motivations.134 A party’s legitimate motivations for engaging in
litigation conduct may thus be inextricably intertwined with certain
“improper purposes”—even in her own mind. And if that’s so, the
argument goes, it becomes conceptually difficult to proscribe the
party’s conduct based on her motives, as the motivation-sensitive
restrictions purport to do.
This difficulty, though hardly unique to civil procedure, is
compounded by the fact that some of the motivation-sensitive
restrictions employ one of the more indeterminate standards for
assessing mixed motives. In particular, rather than prohibit every
instance of conduct tainted by an impermissible motivation, some of
the restrictions purport to condemn only conduct for which an
impermissible motivation predominates over other, permissible ones.
131. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 119, at 12–13, 62–73.
132. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (authorizing parties to request documents and other
evidence from each other).
133. I am grateful to Kim Ferzan for pressing me to consider this possibility. See also
infra notes 265–266 and accompanying text (developing a similar account in terms of the civil
recourse theory of tort law).
134. Cf. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 51 (2004) (“[T]he line between
vindictiveness and vindication is often difficult to draw.”).
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One commits the wrongful civil litigation tort, for example, only
when one brings the offending lawsuit “primarily” for an improper
purpose.135 But such a standard seems to invite an indefinite
inquiry, requiring judges to ascertain all the reasons for which a
party acted and to assign primary significance to just one. That
enterprise might seem much less sound conceptually than either
sanctioning only conduct motivated solely by an improper purpose
(a so-called “sole motive” standard) or sanctioning all conduct
motivated even partly by an improper purpose, whatever other
purposes may also be motivating it (an “any motive” standard).136
And yet, the motivation-sensitive restrictions may nevertheless end
up resembling a “sole motive” standard in practice, inasmuch as
courts tend to sanction only the most egregious litigation
misconduct137 and some rules afford parties the opportunity to
withdraw dubious filings before sanctions may be imposed.138
Whatever the conceptual coherence of a “primary” or
“predominant” motive standard, it seems perfectly intelligible to
single out litigation misconduct that is so flagrant as to be
tantamount to misconduct motivated solely by an improper
purpose, even if other, permissible purposes may also be lurking in
the background.
Even when so limited, the motivation-sensitive restrictions
might prompt a normative concern about the state’s evaluating
parties’ subjective motivations for taking certain actions during
civil litigation. The state, one might think, shouldn’t be in the
business of predicating the permissibility of litigation conduct on
135. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 35, § 592; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
136. See Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106,
1161–62 (2018).
137. See, e.g., Antolini v. McCloskey, 335 F.R.D. 361, 364 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting
Int’l Techs. Mktg. v. Verint Sys., No. 15-cv-2457, 2019 WL 1244493, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
2019)) (“Courts maintain a high bar for establishing a Rule 11 violation given judicial concern
for encouraging zealous advocacy.”); cf. M. Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard,
Judicial Noncompliance with Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S87 (2015) (finding that judges rarely fulfill a statutory
requirement that they certify plaintiffs’ compliance with Rule 11 in certain securities cases).
In this respect, the motivation-sensitive restrictions, along with civil procedure’s other
regulations of litigation conduct, may be “underenforced.” Cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Even so, as
the cases cited throughout this Article attest, the restrictions meaningfully limit parties and
cast a significant shadow over civil practice.
138. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (creating a twenty-one-day “safe harbor” during
which a party may withdraw an offending paper and thereby prevent the opposing party
from moving for sanctions).
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the kinds of reasons for which parties engage in it. Such concerns
sound in the First Amendment. Indeed, the First Amendment’s
Petition Clause has generally been assumed to protect a right to
seek redress in the courts, and some courts have suggested in
certain contexts that the petition right may not be conditioned
solely on the motivations with which a petition is made,
irrespective of the petition’s objective validity, lest the government
engage in a form of impermissible viewpoint discrimination.139 This
may help to explain courts’ apparent reluctance to enforce the
motivation-sensitive restrictions to their fullest extent.140 Such an
understanding of the First Amendment, however, threatens to
sweep very broadly, potentially condemning myriad other purposebased rules, including much of antidiscrimination law. More
fundamentally, given the extensive (and often coercive) powers that
civil litigation affords private parties,141 prescinding from the
motivations with which parties exercise those powers would require
the state to not merely tolerate but actively facilitate many forms of
wrongdoing, which, as we’ll see when we examine more closely the
kinds of purposes the motivation-sensitive restrictions proscribe,142
include wrongdoing that directly compromises the integrity of the
civil justice system. The state should have some leeway to prevent
private parties from bending the civil justice system toward
particularly unjust ends.
In addition to the foregoing conceptual and moral objections,
scholars have raised epistemic or evidentiary doubts about purposebased rules such as bans on disparate-treatment discrimination,
doubts that may appear to impugn civil procedure’s motivationsensitive restrictions as well. I’ve been assuming that individuals’
139. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated Suits,
Rule 11, and the First Amendment, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1 (positing a “tension” between Rule 11
and the Petition Clause in “politically motivated suits”); cf. Carol Rice Andrews, The First
Amendment Problem with the Motive Restrictions in the Rules of Professional Conduct, 24 J. LEGAL
PROF. 13 (2000) (identifying a similar conflict between the Petition Clause and motivationbased restrictions in professional ethics rules). Consistent with such concerns, the NoerrPennington doctrine, “a rule of statutory construction that requires courts to construe statutes
to avoid burdening conduct that implicates the protections of the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment,” excludes from protection only litigation conduct that is both “objectively
baseless” and motivated by an improper purpose. United States v. Koziol, 993 F.3d 1160, 1171
(9th Cir. 2021).
140. See supra note 137.
141. See generally Matthew A. Shapiro, Delegating Procedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 983,
993–1014 (2018).
142. See infra Section II.B.
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motivations are relatively transparent, such that they can be more
or less readily perceived by courts. Yet that contradicts the widely
held view that individuals’ “motivations are inescapably opaque:
[w]e can never know for certain what motivates actions, and people
have strategic incentives to misrepresent their motives, even to
themselves.”143 If that’s so, then “reliably discerning motivational
types . . . is likely impossible.”144 Such skepticism seems to be borne
out by how courts tend to apply the motivation-sensitive
restrictions in practice, often employing objective proxies for
parties’ motivations in lieu of direct inquiries into their subjective
mental states.145 In resorting to objective indicia of an ostensibly
subjective form of wrongdoing, courts might appear to be tacitly
conceding the impracticability of determining the true motivations
with which parties engage in litigation conduct, and thus the
futility of applying the motivation-sensitive restrictions on their
own, subjective terms.
We should be careful, though, to distinguish two different ways
in which objective considerations might relate to an avowedly
subjective legal standard. On the one hand, objective criteria might
perform a merely evidentiary function, providing indirect
indications of an individual’s motivations when we lack more
direct, conclusive proof—as will usually be the case, given that
individuals obviously have strong incentives to conceal their illicit
motives. And indeed, the law routinely employs such indirect
proxies,146 from burden-shifting frameworks147 to scrutiny tests
designed to “smoke out” improper motivations.148 Courts’ reliance
on these various evidentiary frameworks doesn’t belie the
subjective nature of purpose-based rules: even though we can’t see
into other individuals’ minds and definitively discern the reasons
for which they act, there are still better and worse approximations
of such insight, and we can have reasonable, if not complete,
confidence in our assessments of others’ motives. On the other
143. Jack Knight & Melissa Schwartzberg, Institutional Bargaining for Democratic Theorists
(or How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Haggling), 23 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 259, 272 (2020).
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
146. See Fallon, supra note 128, at 580.
147. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (articulating a
burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination claims under Title VII).
148. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 104, at 902–05 (describing how inquiry into illicit
“purpose” in constitutional antidiscrimination law can be understood as a way of “smoking
out” bad-faith conduct, though noting that such norms are “underenforced”).
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hand, there may well come a point at which the objective proxies
supplant the subjective standard they purport to implement. To
categorically deem objective indicia to be sufficient evidence of an
illicit motivation is to effectively transmute a nominally subjective
standard into an objective one.149 While it can be difficult to
determine precisely when that line has been crossed, it nevertheless
seems possible to distinguish legal rules that continue to genuinely
aim at subjective features such as individuals’ mental states, even
if via objective evidentiary proxies, from those that have given up
the game as not worth the candle and simply redefined the
wrongdoing they proscribe objectively.
We can see objective criteria playing both roles in courts’
applications of civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions.
When, for instance, some courts infer an illicit motivation under
Rule 11’s “improper purpose” prong from the mere fact that a
plaintiff filed a baseless claim,150 they conflate that provision’s
subjective element with Rule 11’s other prongs, which define
procedural wrongdoing objectively, as the submission of any
“paper” lacking adequate legal or evidentiary support.151 Many
courts, however, treat such objective factors as probative, but not
dispositive, evidence of illicit motivations.152 On this approach,
there remains a gap between the wrongdoing and the evidence used
to prove it; while the weakness of a plaintiff’s claim may raise the
suspicion that she acted for an illegitimate reason, it doesn’t
definitively establish her motivations without further corroborating
evidence. It’s precisely that gap—the possibility that a party might
act unreasonably yet without an illicit motive—that preserves the
independence of the subjective element in Rule 11’s “improper
purpose” prong and the other motivation-sensitive restrictions.
149. Cf. William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 184–92 (2019)
(attempting to redefine the concept of “animus” in constitutional law as an objective quality
rather than “subjective ill will” by proposing that courts automatically infer animus from
various objective indicia).
150. See cases cited supra note 71; see also cases cited infra note 295.
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)–(4).
152. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., United States v. Koziol, 993 F.3d
1160, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding in a criminal extortion case that a reasonable jury could
infer that the defendant had acted with an improper motive from the facts that he never
actually filed the threatened lawsuit and that he knew that his claims were baseless and had
even fabricated evidence); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 369–70 (3d Cir.
2020) (holding that “[e]vidence that a [party] knew its claims were meritless may” constitute
circumstantial evidence of an improper subjective motivation for purposes of the “sham
litigation” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
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At the same time, considering objective criteria allows courts to
get some purchase on parties’ subjective motivations, if not the
elusive “certain[ty]”153 that many critics of purpose-based rules
seem to demand.
The upshot is that civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions are no less conceptually coherent or evidentiarily tractable
than other purpose-based rules such as bans on disparate-treatment
discrimination simply because they predicate the permissibility of
litigation conduct on parties’ motives rather than intentions.
The motivation-sensitive restrictions differ from many other
purpose-based rules not only in terms of the kinds, but also in terms
of the number, of motivations they proscribe. Prohibitions against
disparate-treatment discrimination single out only a few select
prohibited grounds—in the case of Title VII, “race, color, religion,
sex, [and] national origin.”154 The motivation-sensitive restrictions,
by contrast, forbid parties to act during civil litigation for a
fairly wide range of reasons. Although some of the restrictions
enumerate certain “improper purposes” for engaging in litigation
conduct, the lists are merely illustrative, leaving courts to specify
additional illicit motives.155 It’s consequently easier, in this respect,
to violate the motivation-sensitive restrictions than prohibitions
against disparate-treatment discrimination, for unlike the
employer deciding whether to fire her employee, the party
deciding whether to make a discovery request can never be certain
that some of her reasons for taking that action won’t subsequently
be deemed “improper.”
And yet, the motivation-sensitive restrictions by no means fully
dictate parties’ purposes during litigation. Because they generally
emulate bans on disparate-treatment discrimination in excluding
illegitimate reasons for action rather than compelling legitimate
ones, the rules still leave parties free to engage in litigation conduct
with myriad motivations, albeit fewer than remain permissible
under bans on disparate-treatment discrimination. And as we’ll see
in the next section, the remaining, permissible motivations include
not only noble reasons, but also many baser ones that nevertheless

153. Knight & Schwartzberg, supra note 143, at 272.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
155. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (prohibiting the presentation of a “paper” for “any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost
of litigation” (emphasis added)).
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fall short of being deemed “improper.”156 The motivation-sensitive
restrictions can, in this regard, be understood as trying to carve out
a liminal space between the traditional private law categories of
good faith and bad faith: whereas private law tends to posit a strict
dichotomy between the categories, such that one necessarily acts
either in good faith or in bad faith,157 civil procedure’s motivationsensitive restrictions seem to contemplate an intermediate category
of “not bad faith,” whereby a party can act permissibly even if
her motives don’t quite amount to “good faith.”158 Even the few
rules in civil procedure that impose genuine “good-faith”
requirements159 constrain parties’ motivations only slightly more
strictly. For the conception of good faith they codify more closely
resembles contract law’s conception of good faith, which still permits
individuals to pursue their own interests, than fiduciary law’s
conception, which doesn’t.160 In eschewing more comprehensive
motivational requirements, civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive

156. Cf. Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of
Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 445–48 (2010) (observing that parties and
their lawyers are permitted to act contrary to various public values during civil litigation).
157. See Pozen, supra note 104, at 890 n.10 (noting that most areas of law posit a strict
good faith/bad faith binary, with the possible exception of Delaware corporate law, which
may have once recognized an intermediate “not good faith” category).
158. Civil procedure scholars tend to elide this intermediate category in their analyses
of procedural wrongdoing. According to Alexandra Lahav, for instance, “[g]ood lawsuits are
brought with the intention of redressing a wrong, forcing defendants to answer for their
conduct, enforcing existing law, or improving existing law,” while “[b]ad lawsuits are
brought to harass, annoy, or obtain payment wrongfully, and are without a basis in law.”
ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 17 (2017); see also id. at 123 (“Most people agree
that increasing the legitimate enforcement of rights is good for society, and most people
agree that litigation can be bad for society when it is not brought to enforce rights and
obligations, but rather to harass or intimidate the other side.”). But this dichotomy overlooks
the fact that a lawsuit can be perfectly permissible even if it’s not affirmatively motivated by
any of the “good” purposes Lahav enumerates, so long as it isn’t motivated by any of the
“bad” ones. Note as well that, like some courts, Lahav conflates the two basic categories
of procedural wrongdoing distinguished in Part I, ignoring motivation-sensitive
restrictions, such as Rule 11’s improper-purpose prong, that condemn ill-motivated
litigation even when it has “a basis in law.” See supra notes 70–71, 151 and accompanying
text. Conversely, Lahav at other times seems to gloss over the many other restrictions that
condemn unreasonable litigation conduct irrespective of the motivations underlying it. See,
e.g., LAHAV, supra, at 18 (appearing to endorse “the idea that . . . we . . . should only sanction
[parties] when they act in bad faith”).
159. See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
160. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1658 (1989).
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restrictions afford parties a significant “personal prerogative” to act
out of self-interest during civil litigation.161
B. Private Motivations and Public Values
If the motivation-sensitive restrictions proscribe only certain
subjective mental states while leaving parties free to act with all
others, then how, exactly, does civil procedure delimit the set of
forbidden motivations? We can begin to answer that question by
examining the kinds of purposes the restrictions themselves and
courts applying them identify as improper. That review reveals that
all the impermissible motivations are inconsistent with public
values that are integral to the proper functioning of the civil justice
system. There are, to be sure, various ways in which parties’
motivations can contravene public values, and there’s no simple
formula for distinguishing those public values that are sufficiently
important to warrant forbidding parties to act with contrary
motivations from those values whose violation during civil litigation
can be tolerated. The motivation-sensitive restrictions consequently
tend to be “open textured” rather than highly determinate, reflecting
the difficulty of specifying the most objectionable party motivations
ex ante.162 But on closer inspection, the public values safeguarded by
the restrictions all turn out to share roots in traditional principles of
equity, even as they remain amenable to ongoing contestation and
development through dynamic legal and political processes. If
“private law is the law that persons use to structure their lives in
relation to others,” while public law involves a “mechanism of
collective governance and the use of coercion to promote compliance
with collectively determined norms,”163 then the motivation161. On the general idea of a personal or “agent-centered” prerogative to refrain from
pursuing collective goals, see SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL
CONCEPTIONS 41–79 (rev. ed. 1994). For an account of the various ways in which a legitimate
personal prerogative can conflict with specifically egalitarian collective goals, see generally
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991).
162. Cf. Andrew S. Gold, Equity and the Right to Do Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY 72, 80 (Dennis Klimchuk, Irit Samet & Henry E. Smith
eds., 2020) (“[T]he open-textured features of equitable reasoning are understandable as a
response to difficulties in ex ante rule-making.”); Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130
YALE L.J. 1050, 1089 (2021) (noting that the equitable “style of legal reasoning is more open
textured and more directly oriented to fairness and morality than is usually the case in the
rest of law”).
163. Thomas W. Merrill, Private and Public Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW
PRIVATE LAW 575, 578 (Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B. Kelly, Emily Sherwin
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sensitive restrictions imbue civil litigation with some of the values of
public law, even in private law cases.
1. The Public Implications of Prohibited Private Purposes
Some of the motivation-sensitive restrictions, as well as the case
law applying them, identify core examples of the purposes or
motives parties are forbidden to act with, and those illustrative
illicit motivations, in turn, represent distinct modes of violating
public values that are peculiarly, if not uniquely, implicated by the
resolution of disputes through the civil justice system. The
prohibited motivations and the respective public values they
contravene fall into at least four categories—the first two of which
involve preventing the civil justice system from performing its
main function of accurately resolving the parties’ dispute and the
latter two of which involve commandeering the civil justice system
to perpetrate injustice beyond the litigation.
First, some motivations flatly contradict civil litigation’s core
function of accurately resolving the dispute before the court “on the
merits” according to the underlying facts and applicable law. The
Second Restatement of Torts thus provides that a party satisfies the
“improper purpose” element of the wrongful civil litigation tort
when he files a lawsuit even though he “is aware that his claim is
not meritorious.”164 The wrong, to be clear, doesn’t consist in
merely filing a meritless claim; a plaintiff commits the tort only if
he is subjectively “aware” of the claim’s lack of merit, however
& Henry E. Smith eds., 2021). This Article thus assumes some version of the public/private
distinction. Legal realists have long criticized that distinction as illusory. See, e.g., LOUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 61–67 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 351–53
(1993); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349 (1982). And yet, notwithstanding that critique, the public/private distinction
remains a “foundational premise of our constitutional order.” Gillian E. Metzger,
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369–70 (2003); see also, e.g., RADIN, supra
note 8, at 36 (“[O]ur society’s underlying commitment to the idea of private
ordering . . . unequivocally relies on the existence of a distinction between the realms of
public and private action and ordering—a public/private distinction.”). One can continue to
recognize “public law” and “private law,” or “public values” and “private values,” as
meaningful conceptual categories while acknowledging that the boundaries between them
are porous. Cf., e.g., J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
YALE L.J. 1935, 1968 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH (1993)) (suggesting that, rather than “abolish the distinctions between concepts
like public and private,” we should “understand these boundaries as more flexible”); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 (2000) (similar).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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meritless or even frivolous it objectively might be.165 The
Restatement seems to assume that such awareness bespeaks an
improper purpose on the part of the plaintiff to dupe the court into
granting him relief to which he knows he isn’t legally entitled.
After all, the Restatement suggests, most plaintiffs wouldn’t
knowingly file a meritless lawsuit unless they planned to submit
“manufactured or perjured testimony” or to otherwise see to it that
“the court or jury is misled in some way.”166 And when a plaintiff
acts with such an aim, “[h]e is then abusing the general purpose of
bringing civil proceedings and is not seeking a proper adjudication
of the claim on which the civil proceeding is based.”167
Parties act with equal disregard for courts’ dispute-resolution
function when they treat civil litigation as a mere means to nonadjudicatory ends. Courts have accordingly sanctioned parties
whom they deem to be using litigation solely to garner publicity,
mount a political “protest,” or propagate a political “narrative” for
broader public consumption.168 It’s perfectly legitimate to invite the
publicity that attends certain lawsuits. But when parties act for the
sake of such publicity alone, without regard for the ultimate
disposition of their claims, they reduce the court to a mere forum
for their public posturing, completely divorcing their litigation
conduct from the court’s adjudicatory role. Courts cannot
accurately resolve disputes when the parties before them are acting
at cross-purposes with that enterprise.
Second, some motivations, when acted upon, threaten to
compromise the proper functioning of the civil justice system more
indirectly—not by misleading or co-opting the court, but by
protracting the proceedings so as to dissipate the court’s and
opposing party’s resources and thereby impede an accurate

165. Once again, I thus disagree with Alan Calnan’s gloss on the wrongful civil
litigation tort. See supra note 85. Contra Calnan, the tort does not effectively impose an
obligation on plaintiffs to file only claims supported by “probable cause.” While filing an
objectively unsupported claim is a necessary condition for tort liability, it isn’t sufficient; as the
Restatement indicates, the plaintiff must also be subjectively aware of the lack of support,
awareness the Restatement takes to evince an “improper purpose” motivating the plaintiff’s
decision to file her lawsuit anyway.
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Such “political”
motives were among the “improper purposes” ascribed to some of the lawyers who brought
lawsuits challenging the results of the 2020 presidential election. See King v. Whitmer, 556
F. Supp. 3d 680, 709–716 (E.D. Mich. 2021).
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resolution of the dispute. This appears to be one of the concerns
underlying Rule 11’s “improper purpose” prong, which mentions as
one of three illustrative improper purposes a motive “to . . . cause
unnecessary delay.”169 The Second Restatement similarly explains
that a defendant acts with an improper purpose when she “files a
counterclaim, not for the purpose of obtaining proper adjudication
of the merits of that claim, but solely for the purpose of delaying
expeditious treatment of the [plaintiff’s] original cause of action.”170
Once again, it bears emphasis that a party doesn’t expose herself
either to sanctions under Rule 11 or to tort liability merely by
taking some action that happens to end up delaying the
proceedings, even unnecessarily; she must instead affirmatively
make the unnecessary delay her purpose. By acting with such a
dilatory motive, the party seeks to divert the civil justice system
from its core public functions, compromising the court’s ability to
accurately dispose of her own case as well as others on its docket.
Third, some motivations reflect a party’s bare desire to use the
civil justice system to harm the opposing party. Such motivations
don’t necessarily threaten to compromise the accuracy of
adjudication, as a party can attempt to harm her opponent through
civil litigation without obfuscating the strength of her legal claims,
in the way that outright fraud does. Rather, the worry is that, in
employing the procedures of civil litigation to harm her opponent,
a party corrupts the civil justice system, conscripting the state’s
coercive apparatus in her unjust projects and thereby implicating
the state in her wrongdoing.171 Rule 11 accordingly deems it an
“improper purpose” to file any paper in order “to harass” one’s
opponent,172 while the Second Restatement likewise considers a
plaintiff to have acted with an improper purpose “when the
proceedings are begun primarily because of hostility or ill will”
toward, or “solely to harass,” the defendant.173 Now, nearly all
parties bear their opponents “hostility or ill will,” as lawsuits are

169. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
171. On the idea that a party, by abusing the civil justice system, can render the state
complicit in her wrongdoing, see Shapiro, supra note 141, at 1032–49.
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1); see, e.g., DNA Sports Performance Lab, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball, No. C 20-00546 WHA, 2020 WL 6290374, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2020) (imposing
sanctions after finding that the plaintiff had “filed its complaint to harass” the defendant, in
the sense that the suit had been “brought in bad faith to vex”).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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typically filed after a relationship has ruptured (or where there was
no preexisting relationship to begin with), not while a relationship
remains intact. So, we shouldn’t understand the motivationsensitive restrictions to banish ordinary human emotions from the
litigation process. But when a party acts primarily, let alone solely,
to “harass” or otherwise harm her opponent, she exploits the
powers civil litigation affords her for ends the state can’t tolerate.174
A party commits similar abuse when she seeks to use civil
litigation to inflict financial or other property-based injuries on her
opponent. A plaintiff thus risks incurring tort liability “when the
proceedings are initiated solely for the purpose of depriving the
person against whom they are brought of a beneficial use of his
property,” as in a lawsuit brought to thwart the legitimate sale of
land.175 And any party subjects herself to sanctions if she files a
paper in order “to . . . needlessly increase the cost of litigation” and
thereby deplete her opponent’s resources.176 In both cases, the
offending party aims to deprive the opposing party of her
legitimate property rights—a motive to cause harm that, like a
motive to “harass,” taints the exercise of the various powers
conferred on parties during civil litigation.
While the motivation-sensitive restrictions tend to focus on
material harms such as harassment and financial losses, a party
would also seem to act with an improper purpose when she seeks
to use civil litigation to harm others in less tangible ways. The
restrictions themselves are capacious enough to bear that
interpretation, and purpose-based doctrines in neighboring bodies
of law explicitly contemplate that some parties will act with a
motive to inflict intangible harms. Many states, for example, have
enacted so-called anti-SLAPP statutes. Those laws impose
heightened procedural requirements for lawsuits that implicate the
defendant’s First Amendment rights, with the express aim of
detecting and forestalling “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and

174. Lest the prospect of “harass[ment]” through civil litigation seem too abstract, consider
how domestic abusers are increasingly suing their victims in order to circumvent restraining
orders and maintain control by hauling the victims into court. See Jessica Klein, How
Domestic Abusers Weaponize the Courts, ATLANTIC (July 18, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
family/archive/2019/07/how-abusers-use-courts-against-their-victims/593086/.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
176. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
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petition for the redress of grievances.”177 And the Supreme Court
has extended the constitutional ban on race-based peremptory
challenges against prospective jurors to civil parties, largely on the
ground that allowing parties to exclude jurors based on race would
implicate the state in private discrimination.178 In both cases, the
law recognizes that parties sometimes employ civil litigation and
its various procedures for the purpose of subjecting others to
intangible harms, such as censorship and discrimination, and it
attempts to prevent or at least mitigate such harms by forbidding
parties to act with such motivations.
Fourth, just as a party can endeavor to use civil litigation to
inflict illegitimate financial injuries on others, so, too, she can
endeavor to use it to realize illegitimate financial gains for herself.
Most plaintiffs, of course, are motivated at least in part by financial
considerations, insofar as they seek to recover money damages,179
while many others pursue litigation in anticipation of more
incidental monetary benefits, such as those flowing from judicial
approval of (or rejection of challenges to) a lucrative commercial
project. Civil procedure does not prohibit parties from acting on
such motives, making clear that a mere desire for financial gain
does not in itself constitute an improper purpose for filing a lawsuit
or invoking a litigation procedure. But when a party seeks to use
civil litigation to extract from her opponent money to which she’s
not entitled, the motivation-sensitive restrictions deem her
pecuniary motives improper. Under the wrongful civil litigation
tort, then, a party acts with an improper purpose “when the
proceedings are initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement
that has no relation to the merits of the claim”—a so-called
“nuisance suit”—or “when the proceedings are based upon alleged
facts so discreditable as to induce the defendant to pay a sum of
money to avoid the notoriety of a public trial.”180 A party likewise
risks committing the abuse-of-process tort when she utilizes a

177. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2021).
178. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (arguing that
court-facilitated private discrimination in civil jury selection “mars the integrity of the
judicial system”).
179. But see Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 701–02 (2007).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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litigation procedure for purposes of “extortion.”181 To permit
parties to act on such motives would be to allow the civil justice
system to be co-opted for a kind of theft, a role the state must not
be thrust into.
Even short of extortion, civil procedure looks skeptically on
parties who engage in litigation conduct for financial motives.
Courts, for instance, sometimes deem parties to have acted in “bad
faith” or for an “improper purpose” when they file a lawsuit simply
to gain unfair leverage in ongoing business negotiations.182 For
similar reasons, members of class actions may not accept payment
in exchange for withholding or withdrawing their objections to a
proposed class action settlement without first obtaining the court’s
approval.183 Such judicial scrutiny is necessary to ensure that class
members aren’t “seeking only personal gain, and using objections
to obtain benefits for themselves,” which would be an “improper
purpose[],” “rather than assisting in the settlement-review
process.”184 More radically, some courts have recently held that
class representatives may not be given “incentive payments” as
part of class settlements, on the ground that such awards “create[]
a conflict of interest between [the representatives] and the other
class members.”185 One can also understand the traditional common
law prohibitions against “champerty” and “maintenance,” which
prevent nonparties from assuming a financial stake in others’
litigation in order to turn a profit, to reflect similar misgivings about
monetary motivations (though many states have relaxed the
181. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 35, § 594 & nn.14–15. Indeed, such extortion can also incur
criminal liability under the federal Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018). See, e.g., United States
v. Koziol, 993 F.3d 1160, 1168–76 (9th Cir. 2021).
182. See, e.g., St. Charles Health Sys. v. Oregon Fed’n Nurses & Health Pro.’s, No. 6:21cr-304-MC, slip op. at 4–5 (D. Or. Dec. 16, 2021) (finding that the lawsuit had been filed “in
bad faith for an improper purpose” because “the goal of th[e] action was not to advance a
valid legal argument or claim, but rather to gain a valuable negotiating chip . . . during
longstanding discussions” between the parties).
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(B); see, e.g., In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative
Litig., 523 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1113–17 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (finding that an objector had “likely”
acted in “bad faith” by seeking “side payments” in exchange for withdrawing his objections
to a federal class action, but declining to order as a sanction “disgorgement” of payments he
had received in exchange for withdrawing his objections to a related state court action); In re
Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 334 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (denying
approval under Rule 23(e)(5)(B)).
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment. On the
phenomenon of “objector blackmail,” see generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector
Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2009).
185. Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2020).
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restrictions to accommodate the burgeoning practice of third-party
litigation funding, or litigation finance).186 While parties may
legitimately seek money damages for the injuries they believe
they’ve suffered or even pursue litigation with the aim of reaping
monetary benefits as a byproduct of the litigation’s outcome, they
act with an “improper purpose” when they attempt to turn the
litigation process itself into a profit-generating enterprise.
2. The Equitable Functions of Civil Procedure’s MotivationSensitive Restrictions
Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions, in sum,
forbid parties to act during civil litigation with a range of different
motivations that are inconsistent with public values integral to the
proper functioning of the civil justice system. While the public
values safeguarded by the restrictions are variegated, a more
general account begins to emerge from the preceding typology of
impermissible motivations. Such an account might start by noting
that, when a party acts with any of the impermissible motivations,
she abuses one or more of the public powers that civil litigation
confers on her. Civil litigation vests parties with various powers
(including coercive powers)—whether to hale others into court or
to demand information during discovery187—and a party would
seem to abuse those powers when she exercises them for reasons
inconsistent with the reasons for which civil litigation confers them
in the first place.188 This observation, however, doesn’t get us very
far, as it simply passes the buck from the question what purposes
are impermissible to the question what purposes, when acted upon,
constitute an abuse of power. More to the point, it risks giving the
misleading impression that a party abuses a procedural power
whenever she exercises the power for any purposes other than
those the power exists to serve. Civil procedure, as we’ve seen, isn’t
186. See J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. 221, 246–51
(2017) (discussing litigation finance’s relationship to the traditional common law prohibitions
against champerty and maintenance). Even as some states have relaxed their restrictions on
champerty and maintenance, they have continued to prohibit “antisocial forms of
maintenance”—that is, maintenance motivated by “malice” or an “improper purpose”—which
still “are treated as a species of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, tortious interference
with economic advantage, or prima facie tort.” Sebok, supra note 4, at 122.
187. See generally Shapiro, supra note 141, at 993–1014 (examining some of the ways in
which civil litigation delegates coercive state power to private parties).
188. See, e.g., John Murphy, Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability, 78 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 355,
377–78 (2019) (casting the abuse-of-process and malicious-prosecution torts in such terms).
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so strict: with the exception of a few “good-faith” requirements, the
motivation-sensitive restrictions generally require parties to act not
with certain good motivations, but rather without certain bad ones.
And the prohibited motivations—the “improper purposes”—
represent not a mere unwillingness to promote the public values
underlying the civil justice system, but a deliberate effort to pervert
them, to turn the civil justice system to ends that are inimical to its
proper functioning. The prohibited motivations, in other words,
evince an attitude that is incompatible with important public
values, not just insufficiently committed to them.189 So, even as the
motivation-sensitive restrictions effectively require parties to heed
certain public values in their litigation decision-making, they don’t
enjoin parties to become purely, or even primarily, publicregarding; parties remain free to pursue their private ends through
the civil justice system so long as they don’t flout important public
values in the process. A substantive account of the motivationsensitive restrictions should therefore explain why parties must
subordinate their private ends only to some public values during civil
litigation—and even then, only when pursuing their private ends
threatens to violate, rather than merely fail to promote, those values.
One possible explanation for the relatively bounded nature of
the cognitive duties imposed by the motivation-sensitive
restrictions is pragmatic: it’s hard enough to determine whether a
party has acted for an improper purpose; as it is, courts must rely
on indirect proxies to ferret out impermissible motivations. Were
civil procedure to go further and require parties to act for certain
reasons—that is, were it to exclude all motivations except certain
permissible ones—it would saddle courts with an even more
onerous, and well-nigh impossible, evidentiary undertaking, and
threaten to mire courts in protracted “satellite litigation” about
parties’ mental states. Focusing on a relatively limited set of
impermissible motivations helps to keep the task of policing
parties’ litigation conduct manageable.
This explanation has some force, but it also proves too much.
For any inquiry into parties’ motivations will necessitate a degree
of satellite litigation. Were that concern decisive, civil procedure
189. Cf. Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Motives and Fiduciary Loyalty, 65 AM. J. JURIS.
41 (2020) (developing a “compatibility account” of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, according
to which the duty requires fiduciaries to refrain from acting with motives that are
incompatible with certain attitudes toward their beneficiaries).
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would never make the permissibility of litigation conduct turn on
parties’ subjective purposes. And yet, that is precisely what civil
procedure does time and again with the motivation-sensitive
restrictions. We should thus consider more principled reasons for
which civil procedure might target the specific impermissible
motivations it does. As shown in the previous section, those
motivations fall into two broader categories: (1) motivations to
frustrate the civil justice system in performing its main function of
accurately resolving the parties’ dispute based on the relevant facts
and applicable law and (2) motivations to commandeer the civil
justice system to perpetrate injustice beyond the litigation. And it
turns out that both of those purposes have traditionally been core
concerns of equity, one of whose main functions is to preserve the
integrity of the civil justice system.
While equity is itself hardly a monolithic institution, some of
the functions that scholars have ascribed to it reflect concerns
similar to those animating civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions. One prominent account maintains that equity serves as
a “safety valve” in cases of “opportunism,” when a party exploits a
legal form for purposes it wasn’t intended to serve but the
lawmaker either failed to foresee or couldn’t readily forestall.190 On
another account, equity protects the legal system from “sticklers”
who “insist[] on their rights in a harsh, stubborn, or otherwise
unappealing fashion,” even at great harm to those against whom
the rights are held.191 Neither account quite fits civil procedure’s
motivation-sensitive restrictions, for unlike both the opportunist
and the stickler, the party who acts for an “improper purpose”
during civil litigation doesn’t seek to take advantage of legal
technicalities—whether the inflexible nature of legal rules or the
peremptory force of legal rights—so much as to invoke broad,
otherwise-unconditional powers for objectionable ends.
The motivation-sensitive restrictions instead seem to perform
something akin to a third equitable function. According to Larissa
Katz, equity also seeks to “ensur[e] the integrity of the legal order
190. Smith, supra note 162, at 1080 (explaining that opportunism “often consists of behavior
that is technically legal but is done to secure unintended benefits that are usually smaller than the
costs they impose on others”). As with most civil procedure scholars when defining litigation
“abuse,” Smith adopts a law-and-economics definition of “opportunism” as inefficient behavior—
that is, self-interested behavior whose costs exceed its benefits but that can’t be contracted away
ex ante because of information and transaction costs. See id. at 1079–80.
191. Gold, supra note 162, at 73.
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as a whole” by, among other things, counteracting “the potential
injustice thrown up by the legal order itself.”192 The state institutes
a legal system in the first place to secure justice, but in doing so, it
also creates yet another avenue for the perpetration of injustice, and
many equitable doctrines can be understood as responses to that
problem. Although Katz focuses on one particular form of injustice
involved in the “acquisition” of substantive legal rights,193 parties
can equally commit injustice through the procedures the state
establishes to enforce those rights. More specifically, they can use the
procedures to thwart the accurate adjudication of rights claims and to
harm or oppress their opponents. Civil procedure’s motivationsensitive restrictions aim to stem both kinds of procedural injustice by
forbidding parties to employ the various litigation powers for those
purposes.194 The restrictions’ structure, as a set of constraints on the
various powers that civil litigation confers on parties, thus mirrors
the second-order structure of equity more generally195—except
with the first normative layer comprising procedural powers rather
than substantive legal entitlements.196
Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions also employ
equity’s distinctive mode of regulation: appealing to individuals’
192. Larissa Katz, Pathways to Legal Rights: The Function of Equity, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY, supra note 191, at 168, 174; see id. at 170–71 (“The
integrity of a system of law as a blueprint for our lives together, requires that the state attend
to the potential for oppression and injustice that is produced by the very nature of acquired
rights.”); see also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (“[I]s there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly embedded in
the history of Anglo-American law than the basic doctrine that the courts will not permit
themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and injustice?”).
193. Katz repeatedly refers to “procedure,” but she means “a procedure for acquiring
rights,” not a procedure for enforcing those rights once acquired. Katz, supra note 192, at 173
(emphasis added). She is thus concerned with a different kind of injustice from the one I’m
focused on—what she calls “the forfeiture of one’s position on the way to [substantive] legal
rights,” id. at 175, rather than the abuse of procedural powers associated with the
enforcement of those rights.
194. For an argument that the equitable defense of unclean hands performs a similar
function, see T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, 47
AM. BUS. L.J. 509, 543–46 (2010).
195. See Smith, supra note 162, at 1054 (providing a “functional” account of equity as a
second-order system that responds to some of law’s deficiencies, such that the institution
constitutes a body of “law about law, or meta-law”).
196. And indeed, those powers themselves have deep roots in the historical institution
of equity. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
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conscience. Equity has traditionally been concerned with the rectitude
of individuals’ conduct, and in assessing the quality of parties’
motives, the motivation-sensitive restrictions likewise speak in a
moral register. But whereas on at least some accounts equity employs
a thick conception of conscience as potentially comprehending all of
morality,197 the motivation-sensitive restrictions presuppose a thinner
conception.198 In particular, they don’t authorize courts to ensure
that parties conform their litigation conduct to all the requirements
of justice,199 let alone morality writ large. The restrictions instead
respond to two distinct forms of injustice enabled by the civil justice
system: the perversion of procedure either to prevent the court
from determining the parties’ true legal rights and obligations or to
achieve unjust ends beyond the litigation that the law would
otherwise foreclose. Because those forms of injustice are partly
constituted by the motives with which parties act, the motivationsensitive restrictions follow equity in attending to individuals’
conscience, albeit a narrower slice than equity is characteristically
concerned with. The restrictions thereby safeguard public values
uniquely imperiled by civil procedure’s conferral of broad powers
on private parties.
One might resist my characterization of the values safeguarded
by the motivation-sensitive restrictions as in some sense “public.”
In fact, one might think that, by grounding those values in equity,
I’ve unwittingly revealed them to be private, since many consider
equity to be a private law institution.200 Some of the values I’ve
identified do indeed lie near the heart of private law—particularly
the first set, concerning the just determination of parties’ legal
rights and obligations. But even there, we can distinguish the value
197. See generally IRIT SAMET, EQUITY: CONSCIENCE GOES TO MARKET (2019). For an
argument that various equitable doctrines reflect a concern with moral conscience, see
Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Christianity and Equity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CHRISTIANITY AND LAW (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 17–18), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4033570.
198. Cf. Katz, supra note 192, at 171 (suggesting that equity appeals only to individuals’
“political or civil conscience,” rather than their moral conscience); Larissa Katz, Conscience
with a Filter, 21 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 22, 30 (2020) (similar).
199. In contrast, for example, to John Gardner’s account of equity. See JOHN GARDNER,
LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH 254–56 (2012).
200. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing up Private Law, 70 U. TORONTO
L.J. 489, 519 (2020) (conceptualizing equity as a “private law institution,” insofar as
“[e]quitable reasoning is sometimes incorporated into private law reasoning”); cf. ANDREW
S. GOLD, THE RIGHT OF REDRESS 201–02 (2020) (suggesting that equity sometimes aims at a
kind of justice between the parties and, in that respect, constitutes a part of private law).
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of doing justice between the parties in any individual case, which
may well be a value internal to private law, from the value of
preserving the integrity of the courts as an institution capable of
doing justice across the gamut of cases, which is a collective goal
for the political community to pursue at a systemic level and so is,
in an important sense, public.201 And in any event, we’ve seen that
many of the motivations prohibited by the motivation-sensitive
restrictions involve using the civil justice system to achieve unjust
ends beyond the litigation itself, thereby threatening values
external to private law. It thus makes sense to speak of the
motivation-sensitive restrictions as protecting “public” values,
even if some of those values overlap with core private law concerns.
Nor should my invocation of equity be taken to suggest that the
set of public values protected by the motivation-sensitive
restrictions is immutable. On the contrary, while the restrictions
have remained relatively stable over time, they have evolved at the
margins to account for changing conceptions of the core purposes
of the civil justice system and of the kinds of injustice that most
threaten those purposes. Courts have, for instance, developed
additional restrictions, such as the ban on racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges in civil jury selection, to proscribe purposes
that weren’t traditionally deemed “improper” in the context of civil
litigation but are now recognized to taint the civil justice system.202
Meanwhile, courts and legislatures have relaxed other restrictions
to condone previously prohibited motivations in response to
changing social norms regarding the appropriate use of the civil
justice system. That seems to be the case with many states’
increasingly permissive approach to litigation finance, a practice
some advocates have begun to tout as a way of promoting access to
justice rather than condemning it as the abuse it was traditionally
portrayed to be.203 These examples show how legal and political
processes beyond civil litigation can alter the public values that
constrain parties’ conduct within civil litigation. As other bodies of
law, particularly public law, espouse new public values and
repudiate old ones, courts adapt civil procedure’s motivation201. Cf. JOHN GARDNER, Public Interest and Public Policy in Private Law, in TORTS AND
OTHER WRONGS 304, 304–06 (2019) (arguing that seeing that justice is done in individual
cases is itself a collective policy goal).
202. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); supra note 178
and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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sensitive restrictions to reflect the values most directly implicated
in civil litigation and to condemn the motives most inimical to those
values.204 The motivation-sensitive restrictions, in this way, help to
align civil litigation with at least some important public values,
even in cases between private parties.205
III. PARTY MOTIVATIONS IN AND BEYOND CIVIL LITIGATION
Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions define abuse
of the litigation process in terms of parties’ subjective motives and
purposes, and the proscribed motives and purposes, in turn, all
threaten important public values that are distinctively, if not
uniquely, implicated by the resolution of disputes through the civil
justice system. Given this normative structure, the motivationsensitive restrictions effectively require parties to attend to certain
public values in their litigation decision-making—not for the sake
of affirmatively promoting those values, but for the narrower
purpose of avoiding deliberately subverting them.
Even such limited regard for public values, I suggest in this
Part, can have the desirable effect of cultivating a kind of procedural
civic virtue in parties: in forcing parties to partially, yet deliberately,
subordinate their private interests to important public values, the
restrictions prod them to heed the civic role they assume by
participating in the public institution of civil litigation. That role, to
be clear, isn’t the role of a public official; the motivation-sensitive
restrictions don’t convert parties into public-regarding agents of

204. Cf. Merrill, supra note 163, at 579 (tracing an historical “expansion of the sphere
of the ‘public’ and a corresponding shrinkage of the ‘private,’” even as “the intuition that
there remains a domain of private law that must be preserved refuses to go away”). Equity
thus constitutes “a dynamic and discursive process” not only “outside the courts,” Maggie
Blackhawk, Equity Outside the Courts, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2043 (2020), but also
within them.
There are several possible mechanisms by which such normative transformation
might occur. Most straightforwardly (but also least plausibly), judges might incorporate
public values directly into their legal decision-making. A more nuanced mechanism is
suggested by Shyamkrishna Balganesh and Taisu Zhang’s recent account of “legal
internalism,” according to which judges refract various considerations regarded as
“external” to the law, including public values, through their professional, “internal” point of
view, including their sense of the law’s formal properties. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh &
Taisu Zhang, Legal Internalism in Modern Histories of Copyright, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1066, 1071–
72, 1091–1119 (2021) (book review).
205. Cf. Evan Fox-Decent, The Constitution of Equity, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE LAW OF EQUITY, supra note 191, at 117 (portraying equity as a way of injecting public
law values into private law).
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the state. Nor is it even the role of a citizen, as parties typically
participate in civil litigation in their private capacities. But the
restrictions nonetheless require parties to shoulder at least some of
the moral responsibility for ensuring civil litigation’s integrity, its
capacity to promote justice rather than injustice.
Even as the motivation-sensitive restrictions can realize these
significant political-moral benefits within civil litigation, this Part
also shows how they may well help to distort public discourse on
civil justice issues beyond civil litigation. In particular, I raise the
possibility (though cannot definitively prove) that the restrictions
might contribute to the coarsening of civil justice debates by
making it easier for participants to moralize what are essentially
policy disagreements about the desirability of certain kinds of
lawsuits and litigation practices. That risk seems to be especially
acute given the current political economy of civil justice, in which
powerful interests attempt to delegitimize the efforts of certain
groups of litigants to seek redress by disparaging their legal
claims and litigation tactics as “abusive.” The motivation-sensitive
restrictions potentially fuel such rhetoric, providing a doctrinal
basis for the notion that a party can abuse the civil justice system, as
opposed to merely squandering private and public resources, by
filing certain claims or deploying certain procedures.
But this Article’s analysis of the motivation-sensitive
restrictions also offers a rejoinder to attempts to enlist them in the
broader cause of civil justice “reform”—to wit, that such attempts
conflate the two distinct types of procedural wrongdoing identified
in Part I. While many restrictions on litigation conduct do require
parties to avoid inefficiency, only a subset—the motivationsensitive restrictions—go further and attach any kind of moral
valence to procedural wrongdoing, and even then, they do so only
when a party can be shown to have subjectively acted for
an “improper purpose” or in “bad faith.” Civil procedure thus
reserves its moral condemnation for parties who deliberately
endeavor to perpetrate injustice through civil litigation, reflecting a
vision of the civil justice system at once more private and more
public than the alternative visions articulated by leading theories of
civil justice.
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A. Procedural Civic Virtue
To see how civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions
might foster a kind of civic virtue in parties, recall how the
restrictions work: they forbid parties to take otherwise-permissible
procedural actions with certain motives or for certain purposes,
and they implement that prohibition by giving parties secondorder “exclusionary” reasons to refrain from acting on certain illicit
first-order reasons they might initially find compelling.206 To
comply with the restrictions, then, a party must have a sense of the
first-order reasons for which she’s inclined to perform a particular
action; determine whether any of those reasons are illicit and thus
preempted by the second-order exclusionary reasons furnished by
the motivation-sensitive restrictions; and, if they are, abstain from
acting on the prohibited first-order reasons. A party can’t perform
this rational calculus without attending to both what she regards as
her reasons for action and civil procedure’s authoritative
assessment of those reasons, as embodied in the motivationsensitive restrictions.
As a result of this cognitive awareness, a party deliberately
subordinates at least some of her private interests to important
public values when she chooses to comply with the motivationsensitive restrictions. Each of the motives prohibited by the
motivation-sensitive restrictions amounts to a desire to contravene
important public values, whether as an end in itself or as a means
to further ends;207 so, by refraining from acting on those motives, a
party privileges the corresponding public values in her procedural
decision-making. And a party will presumably consider acting
with the prohibited motives only if she thinks that doing so will
advance her own interests; so, by privileging the public values, she
is also necessarily subordinating some of her private interests. All
of these deliberations, moreover, are a matter of the party’s
conscience, her assessment of the propriety of her contemplated
actions. The upshot is that, in allowing the motivation-sensitive
restrictions to preempt first-order reasons she would otherwise act
on, a party deliberately, even if grudgingly, acquiesces to public
values she would otherwise seek to subvert.

206.
207.

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
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Such acquiescence can contribute to the formation of a thin kind
of civic virtue. On traditional accounts, to possess civic virtue is to
have a settled disposition to promote the common good of the
political community when acting in one’s role as citizen.208 When
participating in public institutions, the virtuous citizen is inclined
to take the common good as an especially weighty, if not decisive,
reason for action. Civic virtue thus consists of a particular character
trait (the disposition to promote the common good) expressed
within a particular domain (public institutions).
Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions can help to
cultivate a weaker version of this disposition, one more suited to
the specific public institution of civil litigation. Though a public
institution, civil litigation isn’t one in which individuals typically
participate as citizens, much less as public officials.209 Most civil
cases instead involve individuals seeking the state’s assistance in
their private capacities. The state therefore shouldn’t expect parties
to exhibit full-blown civic virtue during a lawsuit: while the
virtuous citizen displays her wholehearted commitment to the
common good by avidly participating in public institutions,210
individuals who come to civil litigation with that aim are generally
looking in the wrong place; civil litigation rarely presents the
opportunity to directly promote public values, and it doesn’t
attempt to induce parties to do so. But as the motivation-sensitive
restrictions contemplate, parties can still subvert public values in
the course of pursuing their private ends through the civil justice
system. The form of civic virtue appropriate to civil litigation thus
consists not in a disposition to promote the common good, but in a
disposition to subordinate one’s private interests when they
conflict with important public values in the course of exercising
the procedural powers afforded by civil litigation. The motivationsensitive restrictions can help to foster that disposition by
requiring parties to attend to their motives and to abstain from

208. See, e.g., JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING 46 (2012); RICHARD DAGGER,
CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM 14 (1997); ISEULT
HONOHAN, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM 160 (2002); William Galston, Pluralism and Civic Virtue, 33
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 625, 630 (2007).
209. At least in private law cases, where no party is a state actor. But see RIPSTEIN, supra
note 85, at 182 & n.42 (seemingly analogizing private plaintiffs to public officials insofar as
bringing a lawsuit involves the exercise of certain “public powers”).
210. See Richard Dagger, Republican Citizenship, in HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES
150 (Engin F. Isin & Brian S. Turner eds., 2002).
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acting on them when doing so would mean employing the
procedures of civil litigation to contravene important public
values and perpetrate injustice.
This distinctively procedural form of civic virtue is less
demanding than the kind of civic virtue that parties might be
expected to exhibit in public law cases, in which a private
individual or association challenges governmental action as
unlawful.211 Farrah Ahmed and Adam Perry have argued that the
various factors British courts consider in determining whether
private parties should be granted “public interest standing” in
public law cases function as proxies for civic virtue, in the classic
sense of a public-spirited disposition to pursue the common
good.212 Assuming they’re right,213 requiring such a disposition
may well be appropriate in public law cases, where the plaintiff
stands in for the members of the general public and represents their
collective interests in the case.214 When parties participate in private
law cases, by contrast, they are typically representing only their
own interests, and so need only refrain from directly assaulting the
common good rather than affirmatively pursue it.
Procedural civic virtue also differs from the kinds of publicregarding duties that Larissa Katz has suggested equity imposes on
private parties. According to Katz, equity sometimes “conscripts”
private parties “to assist the state in the dispensation of justice.”215
The kind of civic virtue fostered by civil procedure’s motivation211. Procedural civic virtue also appears to be less demanding than Ekow Yankah’s
conception of civic virtue as the avoidance of “legal vices”—or “vices internal to the
institutions of law”—which, consistent with traditional accounts of civic virtue, seems to
require individuals to forbear using the law and legal institutions to pursue their private selfinterest rather than the common good. See Ekow N. Yankah, Legal Vices and Civic Virtue: Vice
Crimes, Republicanism and the Corruption of Lawfulness, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 61 (2013).
212. See Farrah Ahmed & Adam Perry, Standing and Civic Virtue, 134 LAW Q. REV. 239,
247–50 (2018).
213. There is reason to question Ahmed and Perry’s account on its own terms. Among
the cases they cite for the proposition that courts use standing doctrine in public interest
cases to identify civically virtuous plaintiffs are those in which courts refuse to grant public
interest standing to plaintiffs who are deemed to be acting with an “ill motive” or for an
“improper purpose.” Id. at 248 & nn.63–67. But of course, given civil procedure’s motivationsensitive restrictions, no plaintiff—whether in a public interest case or in an ordinary private
law case—may act with such motives or for such purposes, and merely refraining from doing
so by no means evidences a general disposition to pursue the common good.
214. Cf. Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
585, 607 (2015) (arguing that when standing doctrine delegates the state’s power to enforce
the law to a private party, the party must completely subordinate her private interests and
affirmatively pursue some public value).
215. Katz, supra note 192, at 189.
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sensitive restrictions appears to be both more and less demanding
than Katz’s notion of “conscription.” It’s more demanding because
the restrictions require parties not merely to passively allow
themselves to be used as instruments to promote public values, but
rather to deliberately refrain from seeking to undermine those
values. But procedural civic virtue is also less demanding than
equitable conscription because parties can comply with the
motivation-sensitive restrictions simply by avoiding certain forms
of injustice, without necessarily having to help to bring about any
kind of just result. The restrictions, in other words, do not convert
parties into agents of justice, even unwilling ones, but rather
require them only to keep out of justice’s way.
On the other hand, procedural civic virtue seems to make
greater demands of individual parties compared with those they
face under the institutional “division of labor” posited by at least
some versions of contemporary liberalism. According to the most
prominent version, developed by the political philosopher John
Rawls, the principles of justice, including the requirements of
distributive justice, apply only to the “basic structure” of society,
“the way in which the major social institutions fit together into
one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties
and shape the division of advantages that arises through social
cooperation.”216 Justice, Rawls contends, requires that the basic
structure be arranged so as to secure and maintain “background
justice,” ensuring that individual transactions, however just each
might seem on its own terms, don’t collectively undermine justice
over time.217 But Rawls doesn’t extend that requirement to the
individual transactions themselves, instead proposing an
“institutional division of labor”: while the institutions of the basic
structure must conform to the principles of justice, “the rules
applying directly to individuals and associations and to be
followed by them in particular transactions” should instead be
“framed to leave individuals and associations free to act
effectively in pursuit of their ends and without excessive
constraints[,] . . . secure in the knowledge that elsewhere in the
social system the necessary corrections to preserve background
justice are being made.”218
216. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 258 (rev. ed. 1996).
217. See id. at 266–67.
218. Id. at 268–69.
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Given that only the basic structure is governed by the principles
of justice, much turns on delineating its scope. Private law scholars
have accordingly debated whether the basic structure comprises
the substantive rules of private law, noting Rawls’s own
ambiguous statements on the question.219 It seems more
straightforward that the basic structure includes the legal system
and its procedural rules.220 But be that as it may, the principles of
justice regulate the overall operation of the basic structure, not the
individual actions occurring within it.221 Civil procedure’s
motivation-sensitive restrictions—with their singular focus on
individual actions and, indeed, the individual motivations with
which those actions are performed—would thus seem to fall on the
individual, rather than the institutional, side of the division of labor,
and so not to be directly answerable to the principles of justice.
And yet, the motivation-sensitive restrictions seem to go further
than the kinds of rules for individual conduct contemplated under
the Rawlsian division of labor. Egalitarian political philosophers
have criticized Rawls’s restriction of the principles of justice to the
institutions of the basic structure for letting individuals off the hook
when they fail to do their part to secure justice. According to G.A.
Cohen, for instance, the division of labor licenses “unlimited selfseekingness in the economic choices” of individuals, who in a truly
just society would be motivated in their individual choices by an
egalitarian “ethos of justice.”222 And Liam Murphy, while noting that
Rawls holds individuals to be under a “natural duty” to comply with
219. Compare, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1830 (2004), and Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant
and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1393 (2006), with SAMUEL FREEMAN, LIBERALISM AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 167–94 (2018), Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193, 193–94 (Gregory Klass et al. eds.,
2014), Gregory C. Keating, Is Tort Law “Private”?, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE IN PRIVATE
LAW 351, 352–53, 359–60, 364-65 (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek eds., 2020), Kevin A.
Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598 (2005),
and Samuel Scheffler, Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure, and the Place of Private Law, 35
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2015).
220. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 10 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)
(including “[t]he political constitution with an independent judiciary” in the basic
structure, though not further specifying the nature of the “judiciary”); RAWLS, supra note
216, at 301 (including “the legal order” within the basic structure); see also SAMUEL
FREEMAN, RAWLS 464 (2007) (stating that the basic structure includes, among other
institutions, “the legal system of trials”).
221. See Scheffler, supra note 219, at 217–22.
222. G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3, 10, 16 (1997).
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and support just institutions and presumes a “strong and normally
effective” sense of justice motivating them to do so,223 argues that the
division of labor undercuts these individualistic features of Rawls’s
theory insofar as the principles of justice that apply to institutions
impose no corresponding obligations on individuals to directly
promote the just aims underlying the basic structure.224 Both
criticisms suggest that the division of labor leaves individuals with
extensive discretion to pursue their own, potentially self-interested
ends within the bounds set by the basic structure.
If these criticisms correctly apprehend the division of labor,225
then civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions expect more
of individuals than the Rawlsian framework. The restrictions
require individual parties not simply to conform their external
conduct to certain standards, but to refrain from acting for
purposes that are antithetical to the public values underlying those
standards. That cognitive requirement, I’ve suggested, can
potentially cultivate a disposition to deliberately subordinate
aspects of one’s self-interest to important public values. While such
a disposition isn’t nearly so robust as an “egalitarian ethos,” neither
does it seem fully compatible with the broad “free[dom] to act
effectively in pursuit of their ends” that individuals enjoy under the
institutional division of labor. To be sure, Rawls himself developed
an account of civic virtue, according to which the state may
endeavor “to strengthen the forms of thought and feeling that
sustain fair social cooperation between its citizens regarded as free
and equal,” including “civility and tolerance, . . . reasonableness[,]
and [a] sense of fairness.”226 Such qualities may well overlap with
the kind of disposition I’ve been describing, and Rawls’s principles
of justice may accordingly permit the institutions of the basic
structure to be arranged so as to foster that disposition. At the level
of the coercive rules that govern individual conduct, however, the
motivation-sensitive restrictions appear to require individuals to
attend to public values in their decision-making—and to expect

223. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 293–94, 398 (rev. ed. 1999).
224. Liam Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251,
280–81 (1998).
225. For an argument that Cohen and Murphy exaggerate the leeway individuals enjoy
under the division of labor, see Samuel Scheffler, Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Pluralism, 79
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 229 (2005).
226. RAWLS, supra note 216, at 194–95.
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them to be solicitous of those values—to a greater degree than is
envisioned by the Rawlsian institutional division of labor.
The motivation-sensitive restrictions, then, compel parties to
subordinate their private interests to certain public values during
civil litigation but stop short of demanding that parties become
purely, or even primarily, public-regarding in their litigation
conduct. By imposing only the former, more modest obligation, the
restrictions seem to strike a reasonable balance between the
personal prerogatives of individual parties and the collective
imperatives that all political institutions must heed.227 In contrast to
traditional accounts of civic virtue, the motivation-sensitive
restrictions recognize that individuals may legitimately participate
in at least some public institutions, including civil litigation, for
their own purposes, without having to pursue the common good.
But in contrast to the Rawlsian division of labor, the restrictions also
recognize that parties bear individual responsibility for upholding
at least some of the important public values on which the integrity
of those institutions depends. We can thus begin to uncover within
the normative structure of civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions a vision of parties in civil litigation as neither publicspirited citizens nor moral free-riders, but rather as semi-publiclyconscious private actors—a moderately demanding vision that
enlists parties in maintaining the integrity of the public civil justice
system while granting them latitude to pursue their myriad private
projects through it.
B. Procedural Rules and Public Discourse
Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions can
potentially foster a thin form of civic virtue because they focus on
parties’ subjective motives and purposes, requiring parties to
contemplate the reasons for which they’re planning to act and to
refrain from acting on those reasons when doing so would
contravene important public values. But that same motivational
focus, I want to suggest, potentially has a significant downside once
we look beyond the immediate confines of civil litigation itself and
consider the broader culture of civil justice.228 In particular, civil
227. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of a personal
prerogative to refrain from pursuing collective goals).
228. Cf. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (expounding the concept
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procedure’s overt concern with parties’ motives may facilitate
rhetorical accusations of bad faith between opponents in debates
about civil justice issues, which, in turn, may help to moralize and
inflame those debates, making them less tractable. Although I can’t
definitively prove any causal relationship between the motivationsensitive restrictions and the current state of civil justice discourse,
scholars have identified similar dynamics in other legal contexts,
and civil justice, with its increasingly polarized camps and
politicized controversies, would seem to be no less vulnerable to
the kind of moralistic impugning of opponents’ motives that the
motivation-sensitive restrictions evidently invite.
Scholars have outlined the various mechanisms by which a
focus on individuals’ subjective motives can affect public discourse
and have traced those mechanisms in several different legal
contexts. As David Pozen has explained, questioning the motives
of one’s political opponents can moralize policy debates by
implying that conflicting viewpoints are not just mistaken or
misguided, but illegitimate and the product of moral defects in
those who espouse them.229 Such moralization can, in turn,
personalize public discourse, emphasizing who is making various
arguments rather than what arguments they’re making;230
“pathologize[] disagreement,” portraying it as a contingent
consequence of corruption rather than an ineluctable fact of
political life;231 and, consequently, hinder compromise, equating it
with a capitulation to nefarious interests.232 Nor can one escape this
cycle by touting the purity of one’s motives, for “[a] focus on
motivational changes may make actors who are properly motivated
prey to those who would seek to misrepresent their motivations.”233
While these various dynamics figure most prominently in

of “constitutional culture”—how various actors regard and discuss the Constitution outside
the courts).
229. See Pozen, supra note 104, at 941 (noting how “constitutional faith infuses
constitutional practice with moral, if not cosmic, significance”).
230. Id. at 948 (noting how “bad faith talk” risks “personalizing constitutional contestation”).
231. Id. at 950.
232. Id. (noting how “charges of bad faith” in constitutional discourse “may
undermine prospects for welfare-enhancing cooperation and compromise”).
233. Knight & Schwartzberg, supra note 143, at 272.
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debates about constitutional law,234 particularly constitutional
antidiscrimination law,235 they also have been shown to affect
discourse on criminal law236 and the judicial role more generally.237 In
all of these areas, the practice of impugning others’ motives alters the
tenor of public discussion, recasting disagreements of policy and
principle as competitive assertions of moral superiority.
Contemporary civil justice debates exhibit many of these same
features, and there’s reason to think that civil procedure’s
motivation-sensitive restrictions are partly to blame. In recent
decades, those debates have centered on calls for civil justice
“reform,”238 with corporations and other defense-side interests
increasingly advocating (and in many cases securing) greater
restrictions on the procedures by which putative victims of
wrongdoing seek to vindicate their rights.239 Consistent with that
procedural focus, defense-side interests have propagated a
“cost-and-delay” narrative according to which plaintiffs and
their lawyers file weak or even specious claims and employ
unwarranted litigation tactics that end up increasing the
defendant’s litigation costs, protracting the proceedings, and, in
many cases, inducing the defendant to settle.240 The gravamen of
such criticisms is that civil litigation is often inefficient—not
necessarily in any rigorous economic sense, but rather in the more
colloquial sense of unduly expensive.241 If civil procedure were

234. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1
(2011); Pozen, supra note 104.
235. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675,
686–94 (2014) (criticizing accusations of “animus” in constitutional antidiscrimination law doctrine
for sustaining a “jurisprudence of denigration” that exacerbates “cultural polarization”).
236. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999).
237. See Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary American Legal
Thought, 25 LAW & CRITIQUE 91 (2014) (analyzing a “hermeneutic of suspicion” whereby judges
impugn the ideological motives of their opponents while denying similar motives in themselves).
238. See generally THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE
BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002).
239. See SEAN FARHANG & STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017); SARAH L. STASZAK, NO DAY IN
COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015).
240. See generally Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085 (2012). For a more recent treatment, see
generally Arthur R. Miller, Widening the Lens: Refocusing the Litigation Cost-and-Delay
Narrative, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 57 (2018).
241. See generally Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777 (2015).
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reformed to curb the costs of litigation, the argument goes,
defendants would no longer face pressure to settle meritless claims.
Defense-side interests, however, aren’t content to portray
plaintiffs’ litigation tactics as merely wasteful or unreasonable; they
also couch their criticisms in the rhetoric of abuse, accusing plaintiffs
and their lawyers—without any kind of systematic empirical
evidence242—of deliberately filing frivolous claims, discovery
requests, and the like in order to “extort” undeserved settlements.243
The inefficiency, on this view, is precisely the point. While plaintiffside interests have recently used similar rhetoric to criticize certain
litigation practices of defendants,244 the charges of abuse generally
go in the other direction. And that’s not surprising: accusing
plaintiffs of abuse is a way of delegitimizing their attempts to seek
redress for their legal injuries—a moralizing strategy that has the
same kinds of discursive consequences observed in other legal
contexts. First, accusations of abuse attribute any shortcomings of
modern civil practice to the personal moral failings of plaintiffs
and their lawyers. Second, if many plaintiffs are not just
unreasonable but unscrupulous, then it becomes easier to dismiss
their objections to civil justice reform as made in bad faith.
242. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 75 (1991); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The
Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1887 (2014). Indeed, if anything,
the available empirical evidence suggests that tort victims underclaim. See DAVID M. ENGEL,
THE MYTH OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY: WHY WE DON’T SUE (2016); Richard Abel, The Real Tort
Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987); Sanchin S. Pandya & Peter Siegelman,
Underclaiming and Overclaiming, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 836 (2013).
243. See sources cited supra note 3. See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL
MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004).
244. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Luke Norris, The Oligarchic Courthouse: Jurisdiction,
Corporate Power, and Democratic Decline, 121 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at
4, 42–43), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4167200 (decrying as
“jurisdictional abuse” corporate defendants’ use of various jurisdictional doctrines to
disadvantage plaintiffs); see also supra notes 7–8 (collecting sources criticizing debt-collection
litigation and arbitration as “abusive”). For examples of abusive litigation conduct involving
arbitration, see Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., Nos. 2:16–cv–579,
2:16–cv–958, 2021 WL 1222118, at *7–13 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2021), which sanctioned an
employer for compelling an employee into arbitration in “bad faith” and as an “abuse of
process,” as retaliation for the employee’s testimony in a labor dispute; Serv. Emps. Int’l
Union v. Preeminent Protective Servs., 415 F. Supp. 3d 29, 31–33 (D.D.C. 2019), appeal
dismissed in part, 2021 WL 1972247, at *1–2 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2021), in which the district court
sanctioned the defendant for engaging in “bad-faith” conduct intended to protract
arbitration proceedings; and Max Kutner, Home Care Co. Says Sanctions Unwarranted in
Forgery Fight, LAW360 (Apr. 27, 2021, 4:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1378974,
which describes a case where the plaintiff moved to sanction the defendant for having sought
to dismiss the lawsuit in light of a forged arbitration agreement.
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And third, compromise becomes more elusive when one side in
the debate is maligned as illegitimate.
Whether or not they’re explicitly invoked in public discussions
of civil justice issues, civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions appear to lend an air of doctrinal plausibility to all these
rhetorical moves. When myriad rules and doctrines express
concern about parties who act for “improper purposes” or in “bad
faith,” accusations of abuse in public discourse can seem like a
natural extension of the restrictions on parties’ conduct within civil
litigation. That is so even though such accusations may gloss over
technical distinctions between different forms of procedural
wrongdoing. And indeed, proponents of civil justice reform seem
to be trading on just such ambiguities, levelling largely
unsubstantiated charges of willful “abuse” to decry what are, at
worst, wasteful or unduly burdensome litigation practices.
Their rhetoric thereby elides civil procedure’s fundamental
distinction, analyzed in Part I, between litigation conduct that is
objectively unreasonable and litigation conduct that is genuinely
abusive because of the subjective motivations of the parties who
engage in it. While the substance of the complaints about current
civil practice sounds more in the objective, efficiency-based
restrictions on parties’ litigation conduct, the rhetoric of civil justice
reform is pitched in the moralistic key of the motivation-sensitive
restrictions. Proponents of civil justice reform can thus be
understood to be leveraging the moral valence of the motivationsensitive restrictions to condemn practices that wouldn’t
necessarily violate those restrictions. Despite their relatively
limited ambit, the motivation-sensitive restrictions may end up
helping to underwrite allegations of abuse even when civil
procedure itself wouldn’t regard the deprecated litigation conduct
as truly abusive.
This kind of rhetorical slippage, moreover, is unlikely to remain
confined to public discourse; rather, it threatens to seep back into
legal practice, where it can distort the interpretation and
application of the motivation-sensitive restrictions themselves.
Recall that the content of the motivation-sensitive restrictions can
adapt in response to dynamic political processes, with various
litigation purposes being deemed either proper or improper as
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different public values either wax or wane in importance.245 Among
those processes are the public fora in which debates about civil
justice issues occur. So, as public discourse around civil justice
issues becomes increasingly moralized, with litigation “abuse”
being defined ever more capaciously to invest merely inefficient
litigation conduct with the moral valence associated with
maliciously motivated conduct, we can expect the motivationsensitive restrictions to subtly expand in similar ways to encompass
ever broader swaths of the litigation landscape. And that’s arguably
what’s happening when some courts take an increasingly objective
approach to the restrictions, treating objectively baseless litigation
conduct, for instance, as dispositive evidence of an “improper
purpose” under Rule 11.246 Just as the motivation-sensitive
restrictions can shape public discourse on civil justice issues, so, too,
can that discourse, in turn, alter judicial understandings of the
restrictions’ scope—a feedback loop that illustrates the deep
connections between the politics and practice of civil justice.
C. Private Motivations in a Public Civil Justice System
Appreciating the place of the motivation-sensitive restrictions
in civil procedure’s framework for regulating parties’ litigation
conduct reveals a neglected dimension of debates about civil justice
“reform.” Those debates, it turns out, aren’t just about finding some
optimal “balance” between the goals of incentivizing meritorious
claims and deterring meritless ones;247 civil procedure also seeks to
ensure that all parties—defendants as well as plaintiffs—heed
important public values in their litigation decision-making. We
should therefore evaluate any proposed reforms for their tendency
to promote or frustrate the latter goal as well. But partly because
civil procedure pursues that goal by attending to parties’ subjective
motivations, it’s all too easy for debates about civil justice reform to
follow suit and devolve into accusations of “abuse” and “bad
faith.” It will be difficult to eliminate that moralistic element of civil
justice discourse so long as civil procedure itself continues to define
litigation abuse in terms of parties’ subjective purposes, an
approach that has significant normative benefits for parties and for

245.
246.
247.

264

See supra notes 202–205 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–71; infra note 295.
Contra sources cited supra note 10.
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the integrity of the civil justice system. Unless civil procedure wants
to relieve parties of individual responsibility for respecting important
public values, the best we can do, it seems, is to emphasize the
relatively narrow purview of the motivation-sensitive restrictions
—the fact that they deem a party to have acted with bad motives or
for “improper purposes” only when she deliberately flouts a limited
number of public values, not, as the rhetoric of the civil justice reform
movement implies, whenever she engages in litigation conduct a
court considers inefficient or unreasonable.
And yet, even that modest understanding of civil procedure’s
motivation-sensitive restrictions challenges leading theories of civil
justice, as developed both in private law theory and in civil
procedure scholarship. In private law theory, many scholars have
emphasized the discretion of parties (and particularly plaintiffs) to
use the various powers of civil litigation to pursue their own
private ends without deliberate regard for public values, whereas
the motivation-sensitive restrictions curb that discretion by
requiring parties to attend directly to public values and to refrain
from acting with certain motives that threaten to subvert them.248
Consider, for example, John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky’s
“civil recourse theory” of tort law, arguably the most procedurally
inflected private law theory.249 That theory is founded on the
principle that “a person who is the victim of a legal wrong is
entitled to an avenue of civil recourse against one who wrongs
her.”250 Crucially for civil recourse theorists, “[i]t is the putative
victim, not a government official, who decides whether to” exercise
the power of civil recourse by “assert[ing] a claim and demand[ing]
a remedy.”251 Tort law thus involves “a legal process initiated and

248. Civil procedure scholars tend to be less enamored of party autonomy, though a
few champion it. Most notably, Martin Redish has long argued that a general right to party
autonomy is constitutionally protected as a matter of procedural due process and that such
a right places strict limits on class actions and other forms of aggregate litigation. See
generally, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009).
249. See Matthew A. Shapiro, Civil Wrongs and Civil Procedure, in CIVIL WRONGS AND
JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 219, at 87, 89–96 (arguing that civil recourse theory
presupposes various procedural features associated more with the general structure of the
civil justice system than with the substantive doctrines of private law).
250. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 3 (2020); see
also id. at 31, 112–13.
251. Id. at 29. Victims’ discretionary power thus includes the power to settle their
claims before obtaining a judgment. See id. at 277–78.
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substantially controlled by complainants.”252 Affording victims of
legal wrongs such control, civil recourse theorists contend, promotes
the values of “equality, fairness, and . . . individual sovereignty.”253
Civil recourse theorists do acknowledge that the power of civil
recourse, while very broad, is rightly subject to certain limits in
order to protect defendants from abuse. Given the breadth of
plaintiffs’ power to seek redress, “a defendant is correspondingly
vulnerable to the decisions of the plaintiff about what, when, and
where to make a claim, and how to pursue it,”254 which “creates
new hazards and quandaries.”255 Civil recourse theorists
accordingly insist that “the power provided by tort law comes with
serious strings attached,”256 and they accept the legitimacy of
“various conditions and limitations on the ability of individuals to
pursue and obtain recourse,” specifically mentioning rules designed
to “ensure that those who are alleged to have committed wrongs
have a fair opportunity to defend against such allegations”257 as well
as courts’ remedial preference for damages over more intrusive
injunctive relief.258
Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions, however, go
further than the qualifications contemplated in these caveats,
limiting the kinds of reasons for which plaintiffs may seek redress.
And civil recourse theorists seem loath to accept significant
motivational limits on plaintiffs’ discretion in exercising the power
of civil recourse. At the doctrinal level, for instance, Goldberg and
Zipursky assert that “the only check on the filing of a complaint—
a minimal one—is the duty to refrain from filing frivolous
claims,”259 even though civil procedure also forbids plaintiffs to file
252. Id. at 73.
253. Id. at 125; see also id. at 119, 130–45. Civil-recourse-style theories, of course,
recognize exceptions to the general principle of plaintiff control, as when a guardian sues on
behalf of an incompetent ward, who nevertheless obtains a kind of recourse even if she
doesn’t get to control the litigation herself. See, e.g., GOLD, supra note 200, at 225–26. But such
exceptions merely prove the rule.
254. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 250, at 205.
255. Id. at 127 n.20.
256. Id. at 8; see also id. at 98 (“Needless to say, the power to pursue and obtain a courtordered remedy is subject to various conditions . . . .”).
257. Id. at 124; see also id. at 207–08 (noting “procedural” protections “such as the
guarantee of an opportunity to defend oneself against a claim, the (usual) placement of the
burden of proof and persuasion on the plaintiff, and the rule requiring plaintiffs to cover
their own legal costs and attorneys’ fees”).
258. See id. at 165–66.
259. Id. at 166.
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even nonfrivolous claims for “any improper purpose.”260 They
come closer to countenancing the kinds of limits imposed by the
motivation-sensitive restrictions in discussing the “problem of the
overreaching plaintiff”:
Part of what it means for a plaintiff to have a right of action is for
her to have near-complete discretion to choose to bring a claim: it
is the plaintiff’s power, the plaintiff’s right, the plaintiff’s choice.
Thus, to have a right of action is to be able to press it even when
doing so is selfish, heartless, or unjust (though not when it is
abusive in certain senses).261

The final parenthetical qualification would seem to be capacious
enough to comprehend the motivation-sensitive restrictions, which,
of course, proscribe conduct that’s “abusive in certain senses.” But
even here, Goldberg and Zipursky appear to suggest that plaintiffs
may act with certain motives that civil procedure actually
proscribes. A plaintiff may not, in particular, enlist the civil justice
system to pursue certain “unjust” ends, such as to “harass” her
opponent,262 even if she admittedly need not always refrain from
seeking redress when doing so would be “unjust” in other ways.
The motivation-sensitive restrictions likewise belie Goldberg and
Zipursky’s attempt to distinguish criminal law from tort law on the
ground that “[p]rosecutors not only have the liberty to decide
which charges to press, in part by reference to considerations of
justice, [but] they have a duty to do so,” whereas “[t]ort law and
other bodies of private law recognize no counterpart to this
prosecutorial obligation.”263 In fact, the distinction between the
state prosecutor and the private plaintiff isn’t so sharp. For
although victims of wrongdoing have no obligation to file a claim,
and although they need not act justly in all respects when they do
choose to proceed, they must nevertheless take account of at least
some “considerations of justice” when seeking redress through the
260. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1); see supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
261. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 250, at 355–56. In a similar vein, they deny,
against critics, see, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 56–58 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002); Emily Sherwin, Interpreting Tort Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 227, 231–36
(2011), that they regard tort law as a substitute for a natural right “to inflict harm
intentionally upon another whenever the other invades one’s moral rights against being
wrongfully injured,” GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 250, at 121; see also id. at 143–44.
262. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
263. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 250, at 356.
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civil justice system—namely, whether they would be acting for any
of the purposes deemed “improper” by the motivation-sensitive
restrictions. The civil recourse power, in short, is more
circumscribed than civil recourse theorists officially acknowledge,
and is specifically subject to more limits, in the form of the
motivation-sensitive restrictions, on the reasons for which it may
be exercised.264
This isn’t to say that civil recourse theory lacks the conceptual
resources to accommodate civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions. Nothing in the theory seems to preclude the possibility
of conceptualizing the civil recourse power as a conditional power,
one that plaintiffs may exercise for a wide range of reasons but that
becomes illegitimate when exercised for certain forbidden ones.
The civil recourse power, in other words, might be conditioned on
plaintiffs’ not abusing it by invoking it for illicit purposes. On such
a view, the civil recourse power would resemble qualified
privileges in substantive tort law, which immunize otherwisetortious conduct so long as the defendant didn’t engage in it
with an impermissible mental state, such as “malice.” Just as
civil recourse theory countenances such motivational limits on

264. Some scholars who seek to apply the insights of civil recourse theory to other
areas of private law beyond torts likewise neglect the motivational limits on parties’ exercise
of their procedural powers. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Intellectual Property Law and
Redressive Autonomy, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PRIVATE LAW THEORY 161, 183 (Paul B. Miller &
John Oberdiek eds., 2020) (arguing that all branches of private law, including intellectual
property, embody “a core commitment to redressive autonomy,” inasmuch as “they allow
the right-holder to make important normative decisions about deploying the mechanism [for
coercively enforcing his or her rights] that are entirely personal and originate from the
individual motivations and desires of the right-holder, subjective and of questionable
rationality as they may be”); id. at 184 (characterizing the “constraints on the invocation,
exercise, and use of [private law’s] mechanism [of redress]” as “minimal”). On the other
hand, the motivation-sensitive restrictions stop well short of imposing the kinds of moral
duties that other private law theorists sympathetic to civil recourse theory suppose parties
to be subject to. See, e.g., Rebecca Stone, The Circumstances of Civil Recourse, 41 LAW & PHIL.
39, 56–59 (2022) (suggesting that, at least in “moderately non-ideal circumstances,” putative
victims of wrongdoing are subject to a moral duty to exercise their right to seek redress only
when they have a “reasonable belief” that they’ve been wronged); see also Rebecca Stone,
Private Liability Without Wrongdoing, U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3945806 (elaborating the argument).
And while civil procedure’s objective regulations of litigation conduct come closer to imposing
such moral duties, they still don’t amount to a general “reasonableness” requirement—both
because they apply only in limited domains and because, according to their definition of
reasonableness, litigation conduct need not be fully justified in order to avoid incurring
sanctions. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring an “inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances” to ensure that one’s “legal contentions” are merely “nonfrivolous”).
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substantive privileges,265 so it might accept similar limits on
invocations of the civil recourse power itself, including civil
procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions.266
But while this account of the motivation-sensitive restrictions is
certainly available to civil recourse theorists, it would constitute a
significant, and underappreciated, public facet of their theory. For
the conditions imposed on the civil recourse power by the
motivation-sensitive restrictions reflect at least some public values
rather than only values internal to private law, and thus
incorporate public values into private law litigation more
prominently than civil recourse theory purports to allow. As we
saw in Part II, the motivation-sensitive restrictions require parties
to attend directly to certain important public values in their
litigation decision-making by forbidding them to act for reasons
that contravene those values. Civil recourse theorists, by contrast,
generally insist that putative victims of wrongdoing should be able
to seek redress for their own reasons, without regard for public
values.267 That accords with civil recourse theory’s more general
account of the role of public values in private law adjudication,
according to which the resolution of individual private law
disputes may well have incidental benefits for public values but
shouldn’t deliberately aim at promoting them.268 Rather than
approach private law cases “derivatively” in terms of their
implications for public values, civil recourse theorists insist, courts
should decide individual cases based on the legal rights and
265. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Triangular Torts and Fiduciary
Duties, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 239, 249–50 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S.
Gold eds., 2016) (discussing qualified privileges in defamation law).
266. I am grateful to John Goldberg for suggesting the line of response developed in
this paragraph.
267. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 250, at 69–70; see also Davis, supra note 214,
at 601–04 (arguing that, under the principle of civil recourse, parties should have wide
latitude to pursue their own interests without regard to public values).
268. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 250, at 267 (“[I]n defining a certain type of
wrong and providing victims with an opportunity for redress, tort law indirectly advances
other values.” (emphasis added)); cf. Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Distinction
Between Private Law and Public Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 1, 1619 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020) (elaborating Zipursky’s account of
the relationship between private law and the values of public law). For example, although
Catharine MacKinnon worried that creating a statutory tort for sexual harassment would
fail to disrupt the social norms that sustained such conduct, Goldberg and Zipursky
contend that the tort ended up having precisely that broader social impact,
notwithstanding the “individualistic” form of private law adjudication. See GOLDBERG &
ZIPURSKY, supra note 250, at 40–42.
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obligations of the parties and, when it comes to public values, let the
chips fall where they may.269 The motivation-sensitive restrictions
qualify this picture insofar as they represent one (admittedly
modest) way in which public values figure directly in the
participants’ decision-making. Some of those public values are
closely connected to the values of private law, as they bear directly
on the accurate resolution of private law disputes (or, as Goldberg
and Zipursky put it, the “authentication” of the plaintiff’s demand
for redress). A plaintiff clearly shouldn’t, for example, be able to file
a lawsuit for the sole purpose of extorting a settlement to which
she’s not entitled. But some of the other public values enshrined in
the motivation-sensitive restrictions represent a more significant
intrusion on plaintiffs’ autonomy. If, for instance, it were truly
up to the putative victim of wrongdoing to decide whether to file
a claim, then it wouldn’t seem to matter whether she’s
predominantly motivated by a desire to “harass” the alleged
wrongdoer rather than a genuine desire to seek redress for its own
sake. Nor, given a putative victim’s absolute discretion to settle her
case, would members of a class action need court approval to
withdraw their objections to a proposed class settlement in
exchange for payment from the defendant.270 In these ways and
others, the motivation-sensitive restrictions seem to compel private
parties to defer to public values to a greater degree than civil
recourse theory has acknowledged.
There seems to be a starker incongruity between the motivationsensitive restrictions and the Kantian version of corrective justice
theory developed by Arthur Ripstein.271 Ripstein maintains that a
269. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 250, at 250–51.
270. See supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text.
271. Ripstein’s corrective justice theory closely resembles Ernest Weinrib’s in many
respects, see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE (2016); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW (rev. ed. 2012), and my comments about the former likely apply to the latter as
well. Other versions of corrective justice theory might more readily accommodate civil
procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions. For example, even as John Gardner
(over)emphasizes the broad discretion enjoyed by plaintiffs, see, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, FROM
PERSONAL LIFE TO PRIVATE LAW 200 (2018) (“[T]he plaintiff has no legal duty to exercise her
legal powers at all, or to exercise them in particular way if she does exercise them, including
to exercise them reasonably.”), he grounds that discretion not in personal autonomy, but
rather in various “institutional” considerations, which reflect important public values, see id.
at 205-16. There would seem to be no principled objection, on such a view, to curbing
plaintiffs’ discretion in the name of those values. For a critical analysis of Gardner’s account
of plaintiffs’ power to sue, see Larissa Katz & Matthew A. Shapiro, The Role of Plaintiffs in
Private Law Institutions, in PRIVATE LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON: ESSAYS ON JOHN GARDNER’S
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tort is a wrong because it is a violation of the victim’s rights, and as
with civil recourse theory, he insists that an essential part of
enjoying a right is having the discretionary power to decide
whether to “stand on” it—to enforce it through a lawsuit—when it
has been violated.272 Also like civil recourse theory, moreover,
Ripstein’s version of corrective justice theory appears to preclude
any inquiry into the victim’s motives for deciding to stand on her
rights. In particular, after noting some of the various reasons tort
victims might choose either to sue or to forgo litigation, Ripstein
asserts that “[t]he law does not make a global moral assessment of
whether you should stand on your rights; it leaves that question to
you.”273 This principle dovetails with Ripstein’s view that tort law,
like private law generally, considers only how individuals use their
own “means” or interfere with others’, not what “ends” they
choose to pursue, and accordingly prescinds from individuals’
motives, deeming such subjective mental states irrelevant to
liability.274 He further grounds that motivational indifference in a
particularly strict version of the Rawlsian division of labor.275 Given
these features of Ripstein’s theory, the motivation-sensitive
restrictions would seem to unduly cabin putative victims’
discretion to decide whether to seek redress. To be sure, Ripstein,
like Goldberg and Zipursky, acknowledges courts’ role in resolving
private law disputes according to the prescribed procedures,
procedures that limit the parties’ autonomy in order to ensure a
legitimate outcome.276 But again, while some of the motivationsensitive restrictions might be justified on such grounds, others go
further and purport to prohibit parties’ conduct even when it
doesn’t threaten to distort the case’s outcome, simply because it’s
motivated by purposes inimical to important public values.277 That
kind of limitation seems hard to square with a portrayal of plaintiffs
as the sole arbiters of whether to “stand on” their rights.278
PRIVATE LAW THEORY (Haris Psarras & Sandy Steel eds., forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3956085.
272. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 85, at 12, 271–75.
273. Id. at 15.
274. See id. at 159–84; see also supra note 85.
275. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 85, at 291; see also id. at 288–95; supra note 219.
276. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 85, at 272–75.
277. See supra Section II.B.
278. It’s unclear whether Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman’s “relational justice”
theory of private law makes more room for the kinds of motivational assessments required
by civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive restrictions. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman,
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Where at least some theories of private law would appear to
regard the motivation-sensitive restrictions as significant (if not
undue) limitations on plaintiffs’ autonomy, the “private
enforcement” model of civil litigation espoused by many civil
procedure scholars suggests that the restrictions don’t go nearly far
enough in curbing parties’ discretion. By “private enforcement,”
scholars mean the enforcement of governmental regulatory policy
through lawsuits brought by private parties rather than public
officials—where the concept of “enforcement” is understood
capaciously to encompass not only lawsuits in which private
parties genuinely stand in for the state, as with actions under the
False Claims Act,279 but also those in which parties seek to recover
for statutory torts such as violations of Title VII’s ban on
employment discrimination.280 Private enforcement is touted as a
way of harnessing the profit motive to bring the private sector’s
additional resources and information to bear on public law
enforcement efforts.281 Through the pursuit of their private
self-interest, the argument goes, plaintiffs and their lawyers will
Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (2016) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Just
Relationships]. On the one hand, their theory purports to admit more values commonly
associated with public law—particularly a thick conception of autonomy and substantive,
rather than merely formal, equality—directly into private law than does either civil recourse
theory or Ripstein’s brand of corrective justice theory. To that end, they reject the Rawlsian
division of labor, see Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian
Framework, 37 LAW & PHIL. 171 (2018), and countenance “affirmative duties of
accommodation” such as duties of nondiscrimination, which they regard not as a public law
graft onto private law, but rather as a set of relational duties internal to private law itself, see
Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra, at 1438–45. Even more to the point, they
specifically advocate curbing plaintiffs’ discretion to sue and control their lawsuits for the
sake of public values. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, The Value of Rights of Action:
From Civil Recourse to Class Action, 26 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566438. The motivation-sensitive
restrictions would seem to fit comfortably within this framework. On the other hand, Dagan
and Dorfman also insist that “relational justice’s interpretation of the distinction between the
private and the public resists treating private persons as agents of collective goals.” Hanoch
Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Poverty and Private Law: Beyond Distributive Justice 8 (Sept. 14,
2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3637034. Yet the motivation-sensitive restrictions make parties partially responsible for
maintaining the integrity of the civil justice system, insofar as they require parties to attend
directly to certain public values, see supra Section II.B, and so would seem to contravene Dagan
and Dorfman’s injunction against “treating private persons as agents of collective goals.”
279. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2018).
280. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 13 (presenting Title VII as a paradigmatic private
enforcement regime).
281. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case
for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107–13 (2005).
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indirectly promote governmental regulatory objectives along with
the underlying public values those objectives aim to serve.282
The motivation-sensitive restrictions might initially seem to fit
comfortably within the private enforcement model, but they
actually prove alien to it. For although they may incidentally
prevent private parties from acting on motives that undermine the
government’s regulatory goals, the restrictions are orthogonal to
the core concerns of proponents of private enforcement. Those
concerns include the facts that private parties might be either
“overzealous” or too reticent in deciding whether to sue,283 that
their individual litigation decisions might hinder the formation of
a “coherent regulatory strategy” in conjunction with administrative
agencies,284 and that they might press rights claims in ways that are
“inconsistent with the original legislative design.”285 If the
fundamental purpose of civil litigation is the private enforcement
of governmental policy, then civil justice reforms should target
private litigation practices that “impair the system’s ability to fully
vindicate the public interest.”286
From this perspective, the motivation-sensitive restrictions aren’t
just inadequate; they’re largely beside the point. Whether individual
private lawsuits are sufficiently advancing governmental regulatory
objectives is fundamentally a matter not of parties’ motives, but of
the consequences of their litigation decisions. On the one hand,
private parties can undermine governmental policy even if they’re
acting with pure motives, as when a party sincerely presses a
legitimate, but aggressive, claim that risks provoking broader
judicial or public backlash against the regulatory regime under
which she’s suing.287 On the other hand, even if a party is acting for
an “improper purpose,” she can fortuitously promote regulatory
goals, as when a party files a lawsuit solely to “harass” an opponent
who did in fact happen to engage in conduct that undermines
282. Cf. LAHAV, supra note 158, at 38 (describing law enforcement as a “collateral benefit”
of private litigation motivated by self-interest). The idea of private enforcement thus roughly
corresponds to what William Rubenstein has called the “supplemental law enforcer”
conception of the “private attorney general.” See Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 2146–54.
283. David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616,
630–34 (2013).
284. Id.at 635.
285. Id. at 638.
286. Id. at 636.
287. For examples of such backlash, see generally Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives
to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782 (2011).
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governmental policy. Private enforcement views individual claims
for relief instrumentally—for their effects on governmental
policy—and that instrumental outlook would seem to extend to the
evaluation of parties’ litigation conduct as well, in contrast to the
categorical nature of the limitations imposed by the motivationsensitive restrictions.
The thoroughgoing instrumentalism of the private enforcement
model complicates efforts to defend civil litigation against charges
of “abuse” and demands for “reform.” Recall that critics of
contemporary civil practice, whether consciously or not, draw on
the moral valence of civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions to condemn litigation conduct that is merely inefficient
or unreasonable rather than deliberately abusive.288 The rejoinder,
we’ve seen, is to emphasize that, even as civil procedure does
indeed require parties to refrain from engaging in various forms
of inefficient litigation conduct, only a subset of procedural
wrongdoing—that prohibited by the motivation-sensitive
restrictions—involves the kind of deliberate misconduct that merits
the moralistic epithet “abuse.”289 And yet, the private enforcement
model’s instrumentalism stymies, if not forecloses, that response.
Just as proponents of civil justice “reform” evaluate litigation
conduct for its impact on economic efficiency, so proponents of
private enforcement evaluate it for its implications for regulatory
policy. Both factions seem committed to treating as procedural
wrongdoing any litigation conduct that undermines more ultimate
goals. That approach provides little ground on which to resist the
conflation of different categories of procedural wrongdoing, as all
sub-optimal litigation conduct comes to be portrayed as a personal
failing on the part of private parties to promote public values
(whether efficiency or regulatory objectives).290
288. See supra Section III.B.
289. See supra Section I.B.
290. In this regard, proponents of private enforcement may find themselves in a
position analogous to that of political liberals in their efforts to defend the welfare state
against conservative attacks. The political philosopher Samuel Scheffler has suggested that
one of the reasons political liberalism encounters so much popular resistance might be that
contemporary philosophical liberalism, in defending the welfare state, rejects traditional, preinstitutional notions of desert and individual responsibility that are widely shared in society.
See Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics,
21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299 (1992). Likewise, proponents of private enforcement, in taking an
instrumental approach to procedural wrongdoing, implicitly reject categorical limits on
litigation conduct that have deep roots in civil procedure doctrine.
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Although the kinds of motivational assessments required by
the motivation-sensitive restrictions thus prove foreign to the
private enforcement model, the model’s proponents hardly refrain
from levelling accusations of intentional abuse to decry what they
regard as disconcerting developments in civil justice. The resort to
such abuse talk, however, only confirms the model’s indifference to
the fundamental distinction between objective and subjective
procedural wrongdoing. Consider the vociferous criticisms of
Texas’s Senate Bill 8, which prohibits most abortions after a fetal
heartbeat has been detected and authorizes enforcement of that
prohibition exclusively through lawsuits by private parties rather
than actions by public officials.291 That procedural arrangement is
open to critique on terms internal to the private enforcement model,
as various aspects of the scheme appear to risk over-incentivizing
private enforcement efforts.292 Yet many critics of the law who
otherwise support private enforcement have taken a different tack,
condemning it as an abuse of the private enforcement model that
licenses “vigilantism” for the improper purpose of subverting
judicially recognized abortion rights and even democracy itself.293
Whatever the merits of these criticisms, they transcend the private
enforcement model, denouncing the reasons for which a private
enforcement regime is instituted rather than its efficacy in realizing
legislatively determined policy goals. Such criticisms thus betray
the need to invoke conceptual resources beyond the private
enforcement model in order to assess the motivations of the various
participants in civil justice—whether parties to individual lawsuits

291. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.204–171.208 (West 2021); see Whole
Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
292. Cf. text accompanying supra note 283. For criticism of S.B. 8 on such grounds, see
Randy Beck, Popular Enforcement of Controversial Legislation, 57 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4029815.
293. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels & David L. Noll, Vigilante Federalism, 108 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming
2023),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.CFM?abstract_id=3915944;
Robert L. Tsai & Mary Ziegler, The New Abortion Vigilantism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2021/09/23/texas-abortion-vigilantism/; Michael C.
Dorf, SB8 and the Madisonian Compromise, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 11, 2022, 8:31 AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2022/01/sb8-and-madisonian-compromise.html
(asserting
that “surely it should count for something that in adopting SB8 Texas sought to defeat the
supremacy and uniformity of federal law” and that the law was motivated by “outright
defiance”) (emphasis added); cf. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. at 545 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
clear purpose and actual effect of S.B. 8 has been to nullify this Court’s rulings.”).
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or policymakers—in the manner that the motivation-sensitive
restrictions demand.294
The conflation of the different categories of procedural
wrongdoing encouraged by instrumental approaches such as the
private enforcement model threatens to distort other areas of legal
practice as well, eliding the distinctive role played by the motivationsensitive restrictions in regulating parties’ litigation conduct. In the
decisions sanctioning lawyers who brought lawsuits challenging
the results of the 2020 presidential election, for example, courts,
while purporting to apply subjective standards of wrongdoing,
inferred illicit motivations solely from objectively unreasonable
litigation conduct.295 And in the context of mass-tort multidistrict
litigation (MDL), prominent commentators identify a generic
problem of “fraudulent, frivolous, or otherwise nonmeritorious
claiming,” as if all three kinds of claims exhibited a single,
monolithic form of misconduct.296 Both practices exemplify the
tendency to reduce subjectively ill-motivated litigation conduct to
other, objective forms of procedural wrongdoing. That, in turn, has
the paradoxical effect of personalizing even objective procedural
wrongs, thereby exacerbating the moralized discourse around
many civil justice issues, while relieving parties of their individual
responsibility for heeding important public values in their litigation
decision-making. As the motivation-sensitive restrictions lose their
unique place in civil procedure’s regulatory scheme for litigation
conduct, parties come to be regarded as unwitting agents of broader

294. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Theory, Private Attorneys
General, and State Action: From Mass Torts to Texas S.B. 8, 14 J. TORT L. 469, 481–91 (2021)
(arguing that instrumental accounts of tort law as “public law in disguise” cannot adequately
distinguish S.B. 8 from other, favored private-enforcement regimes).
295. See, e.g., King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d 680, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (“find[ing]
an improper purpose because Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to conduct the [required] pre-filing
reasonable inquiry” and inferring “bad faith and improper motive” from their “fail[ure] to
take the basic pre-filing steps that any reasonable attorney would have taken and by flouting
well-established pleading standards”); O’Rourke v. Dominion Voting Sys., 552 F. Supp. 3d
1168, 1208 (D. Colo. 2021) (concluding “[t]hat sanctions are . . . merited under this Court’s
inherent authority because of the bad faith nature of the filing of the suit” but inferring bad
faith from the fact “that Plaintiffs’ counsel knew or should have known [that the lawsuit]
was doomed to failure from the very beginning”).
296. Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 23 (2019). But see
Engstrom, supra note 6, at 649–50 (distinguishing between “fraudulent” and “frivolous” claims,
though adopting a partially objective definition of fraud according to which “constructive
knowledge,” not just actual knowledge, of a claim’s falsity can render the claim fraudulent).
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policy goals rather than as autonomous yet accountable participants
in an essential public institution.
* * *
The motivation-sensitive restrictions, in sum, reflect a vision of
civil litigation that is at once more public and more private than
alternative visions found in leading theories of civil justice. Neither
a commitment to party autonomy nor the concept of private
enforcement quite captures the boundary that the motivationsensitive restrictions attempt to demarcate between “public” and
“private” in our civil justice system. In contrast to prominent
theories of private law, the restrictions require parties to attend
directly to certain public values in deciding how to deploy the
various powers bestowed on them during civil litigation. But in
contrast to the private enforcement model, the restrictions
generally permit parties to engage even in litigation conduct that
threatens to undermine governmental regulatory objectives. The
motivation-sensitive restrictions thus reveal civil litigation to be an
institution that seeks primarily to facilitate the resolution of private
disputes, but that also employs various second-order mechanisms
to ensure that private parties heed important public values along
the way.
Although a full defense of this hybrid public-private vision of
civil litigation is beyond the scope of this Article,297 I hope this
Article’s account of the motivation-sensitive restrictions has
begun to illustrate the normative appeal of such a vision. As this
Article has shown, there are compelling reasons to give parties
significant discretion in how they exercise their procedural
powers—whether because of a principled respect for their
autonomy or independence298 or because of more contingent
considerations, such as the idea that private parties will often be
more effective at identifying and responding to injustices than
governmental officials.299 That is the lesson of many prominent
theories of private law, with their emphasis on party autonomy. At
the same time, there are compelling reasons to attend to the
297. I am developing such a defense in other work.
298. As emphasized, for instance, by Goldberg and Zipursky’s civil recourse theory
and Ripstein’s brand of corrective justice theory.
299. Cf. GARDNER, supra note 271, at 209–10 (enumerating several considerations along
these lines).
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implications of parties’ litigation conduct for important public
values. That is the lesson of the private enforcement model, with its
instrumental approach to evaluating litigation conduct. These
two competing imperatives create a need for rules that insulate civil
litigation from parties’ worst abuses without overburdening
parties with public-regarding duties as they seek to pursue their
own private purposes. Civil procedure’s motivation-sensitive
restrictions constitute one prominent feature of our civil justice
system that attempts to strike such a balance.
CONCLUSION
Civil litigation confers significant powers on parties, but it also
imposes significant limits on the exercise of those powers. Among
the most ubiquitous, yet overlooked, limits are civil procedure’s
motivation-sensitive restrictions, which forbid parties to abuse the
civil justice system by invoking procedural powers with illicit
motives or for improper purposes. The motivation-sensitive
restrictions seek not to minimize the economic costs of parties’
litigation conduct, but rather to induce parties to attend to
important public values in their litigation decision-making. In
doing so, the restrictions can help parties to cultivate a form of
procedural civic virtue, a disposition to subordinate one’s own
interests to the most pressing public imperatives. The price of this
increased regard for public values within civil litigation may be a
coarser public discourse about civil justice issues beyond civil
litigation, as policy advocates emulate the motivation-sensitive
restrictions and accuse their opponents of proceeding in bad faith.
While we may be able to temper this moralism somewhat by
emphasizing the relatively limited demands made by the
motivation-sensitive restrictions, we shouldn’t jettison the
restrictions’ focus on parties’ subjective motivations altogether, lest
we either give parties free rein to disregard important public values
during civil litigation or, at the other extreme, require parties to
become public-regarding agents of the state. The motivationsensitive restrictions, with their subjective approach to regulating
procedural wrongdoing, represent an important restraint on
parties as they pursue their private ends through the public civil
justice system.
I suspect that civil procedure scholars have tended to give the
motivation-sensitive restrictions short shrift in their accounts of
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procedural wrongdoing because of their more general instrumental
approach to civil justice. Categorical limits on parties’ purposes sit
uneasily with a vision that reduces civil litigation to a mere means
of realizing regulatory goals. While it’s certainly important to
consider litigation’s implications for public policy objectives, an
exclusive focus on consequences will fail to account for other,
intrinsic features of civil procedure, including the motivationsensitive restrictions, that equally shape our political system’s
pursuit of civil justice. It’s not enough to recognize that civil
litigation seeks to promote public values; we also need to
appreciate how litigation instantiates those values, as well as how it
balances them against other, more traditionally “private”
considerations. We may be in a better position to understand—
and debate—the normative ambitions of our civil justice system
if, rather than immediately trying to determine how it can be bent
to serve ulterior purposes, we start by taking the institution on its
own terms.
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